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Therapeutic Approach in 




This study aims to critically assess the so-
called therapeutic approach in moral education, 
which emerged in the postwar twentieth century, 
in the western part of the world. The proponents 
of the approach used different terms to express its 
essence: value clarification method, or sometimes 
the decision-making method or the critical thinking 
method. These philosophies of education have the 
common feature of a personalistic, non-directive, 
or client-oriented approach to the individual. 
Therefore, I will refer to them here as therapeutic. 
There are many advocates, but some of the most 
notable should be named: Carl Rodgers, Jean 
Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Sidney B. Simon, 
Louis Raths, and Merrill Harmin. For a proper 
understanding of these approaches, it’s necessary 
to review first the cultural-ideological context of 
their origin. After that I will analyze and evalu-
ate their key tenets, which I consider problem-
atic. Specifically, we will scrutinize these prob-
lems: (1) the problem of process at the expense 
of content, (2) the problem of devaluation of the 
educator’s authority, (3) the problem of blurring 
of moral concepts and standards, (4) the problem 
of value pseudo-neutrality and indoctrination, 
(5) the problem of individualism, subjectivism, 
and relativism.
Key words:
Moral, education, therapeutic, method, in-
doctrination.
Historical and cultural context 
Education, in the sense of therapeutic clarifi-
cation of values (and all related concepts), was in 
many ways a reaction to the postwar crisis of val-
ues and culture in general. The coming genera-
tion openly distanced themselves from the “mor-
als” of their parents. In addition to freedom of 
expression, emancipation of human rights, and 
emphasis on autonomy, the prevailing sentiment 
of the flower children was resistance towards the 
“stale” culture that priggishly preached, commis-
sioned, and taught. The culture of their fathers—
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the sick woman, borrowed from everyone he 
could and still had only half of the cost of the 
medicine. He begged the pharmacist to lower 
the price or allow him to pay it in install-
ments. But the pharmacist wouldn’t budge. 
Desperate, Heinz broke into the pharmacy at 
night and stole the medicine. 
Sharon and Jill were best friends. One day 
they went shopping together. Jill was trying 
on a sweater, when she suddenly put her jacket 
on over it and left the store. The guard arrived 
immediately afterwards, stopped Sharon and 
asked the name of her friend who had fled the 
store. At the same time, she threatened to call 
the police if Sharon wouldn’t give the name. 
The questions for discussion are obvious: Was 
Heinz’s theft wrong or not? Should Sharon be-
tray her friend or not? The discussion has to be 
well-controlled didactically in order to fulfill its 
task. Therefore, the authors present the follow-
ing instructions. (1) Recapitulate the basic facts 
of the story and ask a clear yes/no question. (2) 
Give the students enough time to think through 
the question and answer independently, ideally 
in writing, and with justification. (3) Next, the 
students say their answers aloud. If it happens 
that most of the group agree, S. B. Simon rec-
ommends adding “balancing” information. For 
example, if most of the class vote for giving the 
name, the teacher can draw attention to the im-
plications that this judgment would have on the 
girls’ friendship, or bring a new variable into the 
story—for example, what if Jill was from a weak 
social background, and so on. (4) The teacher is 
to lead the discussion in a fundamentally non-di-
rective manner. No interfering unless necessary, 
only steering it by means of questions—either 
stimulating (if the discussion lags), or regulatory 
(if the discussion gets off track) or clarifying (to 
break down concepts or motives, etc.). Teachers 
must also avoid the temptation to express their 
own opinions (even though the students request 
it) because that usually ends the discussion. (5) 
The conclusion of the discussion should contain 
a summary of the arguments (for and against), 
as well as a re-stating of the beginning and end-
ing opinions. Did the students change their view? 
because of the horrors of war that were still fresh 
in their memories—had lost its moral legitimacy 
and become more of a source of shame than 
something to pass along pedagogically. From 
such a background it was not surprising, there-
fore, that in the 1960s there arose a method that 
emphasized discussion, openness, engagement, 
no guidelines, and so on. The goal of the method 
was neither the formation nor transmission of 
any kind of specific “bag of virtues,” in the words 
of Lawrence Kohlberg, or other moral material; it 
was indoctrination, which was considered one of 
the cardinal defects of all traditional educational 
approaches.1 Teachers and educators of this new 
type were given the task of helping students 
think independently and critically, based on the 
psychological assumption that if the individuals 
themselves identified their own values, the in-
ternalization of those values would be easier and 
more durable than if they were mediated by some 
adult. The students were thus guided to discover, 
classify, and develop their own values, that is, to 
construct their own moral universe.
Experimental findings by developmental 
psychologists such as Piaget and Kohlberg con-
veniently arrived just in time.2 Although their 
theories of the moral and cognitive development 
of the individual were not originally intended to 
be educational, their application to pedagogy was 
soon found. Different variations of Kohlberg’s fa-
mous micro-story dilemmas were used in lessons 
as a tool for clarifying moral categories and val-
ues, a tool which was expected to both move the 
students to a higher stage of moral development 
and teach them independent moral judgment 
and argumentation. 
How does the method work in didactic prac-
tice? For illustration, I present two mini-stories: 
Kohlberg’s now famous “Heinz’s Dilemma” and 
“Sharon’s Dilemma” from the just-as-well-known 
teacher’s handbook of Simon and his colleagues:3
A fatally ill woman lived in Europe. She suf-
fered from a special kind of cancer. There ex-
isted a medicine that was recently discovered 
by a pharmacist from the same town. To pro-
duce the medicine was very expensive, and 
the pharmacist charged ten times more than 
it cost him to make. Heinz, the husband of 
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For what reason? And so on. Of course, the sto-
ries and strategies can also be subject to thematic 
changes and adapted to the age and circumstanc-
es of the group. 
The method spread quickly and gained popu-
larity. In addition to Simon’s handbook, which 
became a bestseller, many other similar textbooks 
were published. By the 1980s, however, the first 
problems and criticisms had appeared. I will not 
here critique Kohlberg’s 
theory as a diagnostic tool 
for identifying stages of 
moral development (oth-
ers have already done that), 
but rather I will present a 
critique of the didactic ap-
plication.
Critics admit that this 
method brought about 
some contribution to the moral educational dis-
cussion. If it is used prudently, that is, with sen-
sitively chosen topics appropriate to the age and 
maturity of the children, circumstances, etc., this 
method can help make them sensitive to moral 
reality, sometimes even bringing them to a first 
“awakening” —from, for example, the typical 
adolescent egocentrism, or even narcissism. From 
the viewpoint of the content of the selected top-
ics, this method proved to be very attractive, 
especially in the critical teen years—what ado-
lescent isn’t interested in topics like sex, drugs, re-
lationships, murders, or cannibalism (eating the 
last survivor of a shipwreck on a deserted island). 
Non-directive and group strategies entertain, en-
gage, or activate and thus motivate and stimulate 
students—all results that are seen as the greatest 
didactic currency of this approach. But the criti-
cism is massive.4 
Process at the Expense of Content 
This therapeutic approach to moral educa-
tion suffers, above all, from the “subordination of 
content for the benefit of the process,” says James 
Hunter: The presentation of certain moral con-
tent (content-based instruction) is secondary and 
completely overshadowed by questions about 
the “process whereby morality is acquired.”5 The 
ideological source of this approach is the anthro-
pological assumption of the innate goodness of 
human nature, the belief that people are unprob-
lematically good—both ontologically and mor-
ally. In the 20th century we first saw this domi-
nance of process over content in Carl Rogers’ 
personalistic concept of client-centered therapy. 
Rogers says that people should accept themselves 
as “streams of becoming” in a life-long process 
of self-actualization. Fully actualized individuals 
would then see themselves 
as a “fluid process, not a 
fixed and static entity […], 
a continually changing 
constellation of potenti-
alities, not a fixed quan-
tity of traits.”6 Later Rogers 
explicitly states that the 
process of self-realization 
applies to education as 
much as to therapy. “The teacher,” says Rogers, 
“becomes a facilitator in the process of the stu-
dents’ self-definition […], a resource-finder […]”. 
He would want the quality of his relationship to 
the group to be such that his feelings could be 
freely available to them, without being imposed 
on them or becoming a restrictive influence on 
them.”7 
This emphasis was enthusiastically corrobo-
rated by many educators. William Glasser, for ex-
ample, in his book School Without Failure, bluntly 
condemns education aimed at specific moral 
content as preaching: “We teach mindless confor-
mity to school rules and call the conforming child 
‘responsible.’”8 Simon, Howe, and Kirshenbaum 
speak in a similarly unequivocal way when they 
say that contents of a traditional curriculum are 
“out-dated, moralistic” and strive after the “in-
culcation of adult values into the youth,” and as 
such are “indoctrination.” They, in contrast, seek 
a higher goal, “the facilitation of the process of 
moral judgment.”9 The same appeal comes from 
the constructivist camp. A school that would pres-
ent any kind of “objective morality” is compared 
to an “army camp,” and the teachers to “drill ser-
geants.” Proper education should consist of draw-
ing out values only “as the need arises,” say Rheta 
DeVries and Betty Zan. They continue, “we are 
talking here about a process and not a product. In 
Education, in the sense of 
therapeutic clarification of 
values (and all related concepts), 
was in many ways a reaction to 
the postwar crisis of values and 
culture in general.
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this process, children wrestle with questions, what 
to believe to be good and bad, right and wrong. 
They form their own opinions and listen, listen 
to the opinions of others. They construct their 
own morality out of daily life experiences.”10 The 
last thing a teacher should do is to “dictate moral 
norms to the children.”11 Instead, a teacher should 
“cooperate with the children by trying to under-
stand their reasoning and facilitating the construc-
tive process.”12 
However understandable the resistance to tra-
ditional moral content is, and however welcome 
the appeal for a helpful pedagogical climate, the 
unilateral emphasis on the procedural side of 
moral formation has had the effect over time of 
emptying the contents of moral education as such. 
The logic of the problem is simple: If the teacher 
only therapeutically “recognizes, accepts and vali-
dates”13 students’ moral feelings and perceptions 
without resorting to criticism (because it would 
improperly interfere with the students’ process 
of self-actualization), it’s inevitable that sooner or 
later the teacher will agree with a completely im-
moral construction on the side of the student, a re-
sult which has also been confirmed in pedagogical 
practice. Thomas Lickona recalls, from his clinical 
research, the experience of a 9th- grade teacher who, 
within the framework of ethical education, used 
the technique of “voting on values.” The teacher 
began the discussion with the question “Who of 
you has ever stolen something from a store?” Most 
of the students raised their hands. “Don’t you 
think that stealing is bad?” Lickona comments 
that the teacher forgot for a moment that such a 
question violates the rule of value neutrality. “We 
have a right to material things,” answered one of 
the students, and the others nodded in agreement. 
The teacher remained clueless.14 
In addition to similar narrative testimonies, 
there are many empirical studies that unsurpris-
ingly support the idea that the suppression of the 
content of education leads logically to its empty-
ing of content, and ultimately to its malfunction-
ing.15 If the individual is not exposed to moral 
content, there is nothing to develop; moral devel-
opment simply does not appear. 
Devaluation of the Authority of the Educator
The imperative of therapeutic non-instruc-
tion is not only a matter of the teachers’ didactic 
manner or conduct in the classroom; it basical-
ly concerns their social role. Proponents of the 
methods described above encourage educators 
to programmatically abdicate their traditional 
role as ones who instruct, interpret, and present 
moral content. We have seen a shift in the under-
standing of their role—teachers should act as fa-
cilitators or consultants, sometimes as assistants. 
They still have the responsibility of organizing 
classroom activities and academic discipline, but 
the way of accomplishing it is different under the 
therapeutic conception. In 1963 Jean Piaget said 
that the “imposition of the authority” of an adult 
is, in an educational context, “absurd” and “im-
moral.” In his judgment, an adult should only be 
an “elder collaborator and, if he has it in him, a 
simple comrade” to children.16 
The same philosophy applied in Kohlberg’s 
experimental community (Just Community)—
“students and teachers participate equally in the 
creation and enforcement of rules.”17 Parents are 
also encouraged to take the same approach: “To 
achieve [the] parental goal of raising responsible 
children who grow into responsible men and 
women, parent-child relationships need to be 
based on democratic principles […] of mutual 
respect and equality.”18 To this, James Hunter 
observes that the term “democracy” is used here, 
but it is losing its specific historical meaning. The 
original—Greek—usage of the term expressed 
a way of organizing the political life of a soci-
ety where the roles and relational responsibili-
ties between the people (démos) and those who 
lead them, were defined in a concrete way. But 
educational therapeuticians use the term democ-
racy without that context, and here it describes 
the process of social organization without any 
further identification. Thus, it becomes a code 
or charm legitimizing the right of individuals to 
participate and make decisions in any context.19 
The consequences are predictable. The estab-
lished structure of pedagogical authority loses its 
social significance. 
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Blurring of Concepts and Standards 
The growing reluctance to convey any kind 
of moral content, however objective, accompa-
nied by the phenomenon of weakened teacher 
authority to safeguard the content, had the effect 
of eroding moral terminology and, ultimately, 
moral standards as such. As in theory, so in prac-
tice, the normative distinctions for seeing and 
clarifying good from evil were lost. The concepts 
of good and evil, right and wrong, did not com-
pletely disappear, but they 
were redefined, a result 
that caused a fatal confu-
sion of terminology and 
was a source of misunder-
standing. 
When, for example, 
Kohlberg talks about mo-
rality or immorality, these 
are always relative terms, defined according to 
the level of moral judgment the individuals are 
capable of using in this or that period of their 
development. So as people evolve and become 
more “moral,” their morality is not the same as 
becoming good. For example, if selfishness or 
other character flaws appear in the judgment or 
behavior of individuals, these are considered the 
result of developmental or cognitive immaturity, 
or general inadequacy in their cognitive func-
tionality.20 Thus, the concept of good and evil has 
lost its ontological status, and with that also its 
objective meaning, and gradually also its mean-
ingful referential framework in language, a loss 
that Alasdair MacIntyre very aptly pointed out.21 
In the therapeutic context, the concepts of 
good and evil have slowly become outdated and 
incorrect, precisely because they have lost their 
ability to relate to anything that would be con-
sidered as moral reality. Adam Philips notes 
that the therapeutic approaches have literally 
developed a “phobia” to the word evil.22 I have 
personally observed a similar fate for the word 
guilt. The fact that there is a pathological form 
of this “emotion” has led to its stigmatization 
and the subsequent neglect of its healthy form. 
At the same time, the psychological strength of 
guilt is, in terms of healthy moral development, 
irreplaceable. It has the “power” to save people 
from their tendency towards wrong behavior and 
also to motivate them towards correction, when a 
wrong has been committed. But this potential is 
dependent on a shared consensus on the concepts 
of good and evil. By eliminating it, educators and 
therapists have made the concept of guilt power-
less and forbidden. The guilty one needs therapy, 
not punishment. 
Hunter adds that neologisms such as the 
word prosocial are an unconcealed attempt to 
avoid the encumbrance of 
the old moral categories.23 
In principle, the meaning 
remains the same—so-
cially positive or negative 
behavior matches with the 
statement “what you did 
is good/bad,” but the hard 
emotional tip of the con-
cepts is broken off, and in addition the teachers 
are enabled to distance themselves from termi-
nology that sounds judging or condemning. This 
phenomenon is well illustrated by the fact that 
the frequent use of the term prosocial didn’t used 
to be contrasted in literature with the word evil, 
nor with antisocial. Rather, it was contrasted with 
the somewhat amorphous word negative, in dis-
cussions about the deficiencies of pro-socialism, 
but never to talk about evil.
If the moral concepts still appear in linguistic 
usage, they do so only as categories of meaning 
that individuals construct on the basis of their 
experience. Teachers, then, have the task of en-
couraging students in that construction of moral 
reality, for example, by programmatically creat-
ing the opportunity for students to vote on rules 
for classroom behavior or the values that will be-
come the code of the group. But what happens 
when the students—in their predictable inven-
tion and creativity—vote, say, that someone who 
doesn’t cheat is a “chicken” or maybe that they 
don’t wish to do certain school activities that re-
quire effort, such as grammar lessons or PE, on 
the grounds that these activities don’t belong to 
their value system? 
The obfuscation of moral language is also 
evidenced by pedagogical practice based on the 
therapeutic approach. Critics point out that 
If the individual is not exposed 
to moral content, there is 
nothing to develop; moral 
development simply does 
not appear.
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the fundamental misgivings and dangers of the 
method of moral dilemmas consist in their im-
plicit relativization of moral principles. If stu-
dents are programmatically exposed to unsolv-
able moral situations, they can get the impression 
that all morality is “unsolvable,” i.e., problematic, 
controversial, and ultimately relative. Students 
who are confronted with one extreme situation 
after another in which it isn’t clear whether they 
should steal, lie, kill, or eat each other, in the end 
become convinced that concepts such as good 
and evil are completely vague—evidence of a 
very sophisticated form of indoctrination because 
it is carried out on a latent level.24 But is the start-
ing point of the premise of this approach correct? 
Is it possible to apply conclusions derived from 
extreme situations to non-extreme situations? 
From abnormal to normal? From exceptional to 
common? Let us consider the example of Heinz’s 
dilemma. In a life and death situation, stealing 
seems acceptable, even moral. What would it 
be for a person who puts morals (not stealing) 
above human life? Does it follow from these ex-
tremes that stealing is permissible—even under 
ordinary (or all) circumstances? The answer is 
obvious (at least I hope so). And I believe that 
neither Kohlberg nor any other supporters of the 
critical method would agree with a conclusion of 
unrestrained robbery. Nevertheless, the method 
of moral dilemmas really leads to such a conclu-
sion, even if the teacher is not aware of it. 
Kilpatrick25 wonders how a dilemma about 
theft could help young teenagers overcome the 
temptation to steal money from their parent’s 
wallet. He says that most of the moral situa-
tions faced by both children and adults are not 
dilemmas: most moral choices are unambiguous. 
We simply have to do what we know we should 
do, and not do what we know we shouldn’t. 
The time spent in school would be much bet-
ter used by considering (and practicing) virtues 
such as friendship, loyalty, and honesty rather 
than focusing on unsolvable situations where 
truthfulness seems wrong, friendship is separated 
from honesty, and cannibalism is legitimized. 
Kilpatrick further notes that the method of di-
lemmas, especially when applied to children at 
an early stage of moral and cognitive develop-
ment, is “woefully inadequate,” because it comes 
out of the assumption that children already have 
the “ABCs of morality,” and are therefore able to 
cope with questions requiring a higher level of 
moral judgment.26 In other words, Kilpatrick is 
arguing that before children are exposed to moral 
complexity (remember Sharon: “Is it right to be 
loyal to a friend, or truthful to the authorities?”), 
they should be taught the basics of morality (“Is 
it right to steal this sweater?”). If that doesn’t hap-
pen, the youth are put into moral confusion be-
cause they are instilled with the preconceptions 
that (a) suppress the basic moral intuition that 
some things are really and unproblematically 
good and some bad; and (b) lead to a contradic-
tion between moral theory and moral practice. 
However possible it is to instill and hold the the-
ory of the relativity of moral norms, it cannot be 
meaningfully applied in practice. We start teach-
ing children from the time they’re in the sand-
box that there are some things they cannot do to 
others, and we say the same thing to criminals 
in court. 
Value Pseudo-neutrality and Indoctrination
Critics of therapeutic pedagogy point to the 
fact that, in spite of their claim that the thera-
peutic approach is completely value-neutral, the 
reality is the opposite. Kilpatrick presents an ex-
ample of a favorite didactic strategy, “VV,” which 
is Value Voting.27 The exercise begins with in-
nocent questions like “How many of you like to 
go for walks in the countryside?” or How many 
of you love picnics?” or “How many of you love 
yogurt?” But soon there appear questions like 
“How many of you approve of premarital sex?” 
or “Which of you are for legalizing abortion?” or 
“How many of you are in favor of having homo-
sexual couples married by priests, ministers, and 
rabbis?” Kilpatrick points out that the authors of 
the method have made no effort to separate the 
heavy-value questions from the light ones. They 
are intertwined as though there were no signifi-
cant differences between them. The exercise is de-
signed to give young people the impression that 
“all values are questions of personal taste—as in 
the case of yogurt,” says Kilpatrick. This kind of 
design is not only not neutral, it is “indoctrinat-
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ing” because it deliberately and somewhat de-
ceitfully instills the doctrine of value relativity. 
Whether or not it is the teachers’ intention, if this 
method is used in pedagogical practice, it does 
indoctrinate (although students/teachers usually 
are not even aware of it). 
Proponents of the therapeutic method un-
derstandably don’t like to be associated with 
such a—for them almost vulgar—word and 
vehemently defend them-
selves.28 Indeed, resistance 
to indoctrination was one 
of the central motives of 
the alternative approach. 
But the problem is that 
they defined the term in-
doctrination very vaguely. 
It didn’t occur to them that 
they also held a set of spe-
cific values and doctrines 
that they perforce communicated to children 
by whatever indirect method. Once the term is 
defined, it becomes clear that their approach ful-
fills every criteria of indoctrination. The defini-
tion of Downey and Kelley, to which Kohlberg 
referred in one of his apologies, is an illustration 
of the problem. The triad of indoctrinating crite-
ria—questionable content, questionable method, 
questionable goals—is so general that even its 
proponents fall into it. They communicate noto-
riously questionable content or doctrine—values 
are relative. They use questionable methods—the 
therapeutists’ preferred non-directive methods of 
teaching. Non-directiveness, however, doesn’t 
guarantee anything. Teachers may (and often 
do) indoctrinate in a non-directive way. That 
is, in effect, an effective trick. Intentional? asks 
Kilpatrick.29 I won’t be as mistrustful as my col-
league here. I use the adjective “effective” as op-
posed to “intentional” because I am not presum-
ing that there is any premeditated or manipula-
tive intent. On the basis of my own pedagogical 
experience and personal interaction with fellow 
teachers, I have come to the conclusion that few 
teachers actually seek to relativize moral values 
on the part of their students. Rather, I think that 
users of the therapeutic method simply haven’t 
anticipated the implications of their theory. There 
is nothing more practical than good theory. If, 
however, the theory is dubious, the practical con-
sequences will be dubious too, even though the 
way is lined with good intentions.
Not only the teacher but also the student is 
outwitted here. They were promised a tool to 
“stimulate” moral thinking, which would lead 
to greater moral competence, but in reality they 
were subjected to the process of methodological 
relativization of values. It 
is woven into the thera-
peutic textbooks, not in a 
neutral way but skillfully 
(and probably uninten-
tionally) hidden. Despite 
the rhetoric of value neu-
trality that it proclaims in 
theory, practice shows that 
the therapeutic educator is 
anything but neutral. 
Individualism, Subjectivism, Relativism
In light of what has been said, it is unsurpris-
ing that therapeutic pedagogy has earned accu-
sations of moral subjectivism, accompanied by 
individualism and eventually leading to moral 
relativism. Conservative theoreticians and prac-
ticioners of education have been thoroughly 
heard from in this respect. See, for example, 
Kilpatrick’s bestseller, Why Johny Can’t Tell Right 
From Wrong, first published in 1992. In the title, 
the author makes a deliberate reference to the 
earlier book by Rudolf Flesch, Why Johny Can’t 
Read. In it, Flesch clarifies the reason for the fail-
ure of certain didactic experiments carried out in 
America in the postwar years. Briefly, the tradi-
tional phonetic method of language teaching was 
replaced by the “look-say” method, in which the 
focus of reading acquisition was transferred from 
teachers to students. The authors of the project 
promised greater engagement of students, which 
would lead to more effective acquisition of read-
ing skills. The reality was just the opposite, and 
the project was a total failure, but before it end-
ed (for a certain time it had the approval of the 
federal authorities), it produced a whole genera-
tion of nearly illiterate “readers.” Kilpatrick says 
that something similar happened in the area of 
In the therapeutic context, the 
concepts of good and evil have 
slowly become outdated and 
incorrect, precisely because 
they have lost their ability to 
relate to anything that would 
be considered as moral reality.
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moral education. In his judgment, the dramatic 
decline in moral literacy, which can not only be 
documented statistically but also seen with the 
naked eye, is the consequence of implementing a 
bad method. A whole generation of children have 
been fooled by its moral relativism and are now 
unable to recognize the good from the bad. 
Proponents of therapeutic pedagogy defend 
themselves against the accusation of relativism. 
They say that their method “definitely promotes 
the values of thinking, feeling, choosing, com-
municating, and acting” as well as “rationality, 
justice, creativity, autonomy, and equality.”30 Alfie 
Kohn denounces the “rampant individualism and 
self-assurance” that threaten society as a whole 
and argues for “community cooperation” as a key 
goal of moral education.31 Abraham Maslow sim-
ilarly explains that “valuelessness” is the “greatest 
disease of our time.”32 The term democracy also of-
ten appears as a non-negotiable value that should 
be promoted by moral or civic education. (There 
is even a subject called Education to Democracy 
or Democratic Thinking—as opposed to totali-
tarian thinking). The same goes with respect, tol-
erance, empathy, and the so-called Golden Rule. 
So, no relativism?33  
It is good, however, to ask all these sets of 
values these questions: Where are they coming 
from? On what ontological basis do they stand? 
How are they anchored or validated? One way 
to avoid meta-ethical problems is simply to as-
sert that they are values of the type of univer-
sal maxims or ideals that are self-validating or 
self-evident, and that no further justification is 
needed. But such an evasive maneuver doesn’t 
work in education. From the earliest age, chil-
dren are wired in such a way as to need to know 
the reasons for their actions, or the actions re-
quired of them. The instruction “you should” do 
this or that, or behave in this way or that, calls 
forth a child-like natural and unaffected desire 
to know why. It’s true that there are “why” ques-
tions and developmental stages that really don’t 
need an answer, such as “Why shouldn’t I touch 
the burner?” But others literally cry out for an 
answer: “Why should I be brave?” “Why must I 
control myself?”
Most educators know this fact very well; and 
therefore, if possible, they look for good answers 
or fundamentals, which would give meaningful 
justification for moral values and rights—includ-
ing therapeutic educators. But on what basis? 
Moral ideals are rooted “neither in the conven-
tions of social life or public discourse, nor in an 
external or transcendent standard inherited from 
any particular moral tradition,” explains Hunter; 
and, he continues, “rather, these ideals are rooted 
in the rights (the desires, feelings, needs and po-
tentialities) of the autonomous individual. The 
self, in brief, is both the source of all moral sen-
sibility and the final object of moral accountabil-
ity.”34 Rodgers can in many ways be considered 
the father of this concept:
The individual increasingly comes to feel that 
the locus of evaluation lies within himself. 
Less and less does he look to others for ap-
proval or disapproval; for the standards to live 
by; for decisions and choices. He recognizes 
that it rests within himself to choose; that the 
only questions that matters is “Am I living 
in a way that is deeply satisfying to me, and 
which truly expresses me?”35 
Elsewhere he adds,
Everyone possesses the capacity to expand, ex-
tend, become autonomous, develop, mature. 
[Moral capacity] exists in every individual 
and awaits only the proper conditions to be 
released and expressed. [...] Whether one calls 
it a growth tendency, a drive toward self-ac-
tualization, or a forward-moving directional 
tendency, it is the main-spring of life.36 
In psychotherapeutic circles, Maslow speaks 
similarly about people. Everyone has an “inner 
core,” which “as much as we know of it so far, is 
definitely not ‘evil,’ but is either what we adults in 
our culture call ‘good’ or else it is neutral,” he ex-
plains.37 “Self-realization” and “self-fulfillment” 
are, in his judgment, “instinctive.” Let Maslow 
speak more extensively about human nature: 
Man demonstrates in his own nature a pres-
sure towards fuller and fuller Being, more 
and more perfect actualization of his human-
ness in exactly the same naturalistic, scientific 
sense that an acorn may be said to be “pressing 
Pro Rege—March 2018     9 
toward” being an oak tree, or a tiger can be 
observed to “push toward” being tigerish, or a 
horse toward being equine. Man is ultimate-
ly not molded or shaped into humanness or 
taught to be human. The role of the environ-
ment is ultimately to permit him or help him 
to actualize his own potentialities.38 
Fathers of liberal education like Rousseau 
would have rejoiced: no molding, no teaching, per-
mission, letting the potential itself be actualized… 
What potential? “Creativeness, spontaneity, self-
hood, authenticity, caring 
for others, being able to 
love, yearning for truth are 
embryonic potentialities 
belonging to his species-
membership just as much 
as are his arm and legs and 
brain and eyes.”39 
The therapeutic educational concepts are, 
in their theory, true echoes of this anthropol-
ogy. Again and again we read that “learning is 
a process whereby meaning, ethical or other-
wise, must be actively invented and reinvented, 
from the inside out.”40 Or, write other authors, 
“The individual who is autonomously moral fol-
lows moral rules of the self. Such rules are self-
constructed, self-regulating principles”41 —hence 
the didactic emphasis on autonomous decision-
making and choice, which are so characteristic of 
this kind of education. True values “represent the 
free and thoughtful choice of intelligent humans 
interacting with complex and changing environ-
ments.”42 But the values must be chosen freely, 
else they’re not “right”; or, at least, they are “cho-
sen from among alternatives,” but mainly, “after 
independent consideration.” The imperative for 
free choice has become so inviolable that educa-
tors have been encouraged to “help the children 
look for value, as long as [emphasis mine] the chil-
dren make the decisions. It is also possible that 
the children decide not to develop values. The 
teachers’ responsibility is to support even such 
a decision.” 43 Kohn adds pregnantly, “children 
must be invited to reflect on complex issues, to 
recast them in the light of their own experience 
and questions, to figure out for themselves—and 
with one another—what kind of person one 
ought to be.”44 In other words, a value can be-
come one’s own only through choice. 
Pedocentrism of this type necessarily leads 
to moral subjectivism and relativism, as is well 
illustrated by the handbook of one of the thera-
peutic education programs with the title Growing 
up Caring. Let’s consider two examples. In the 
chapter on cheating in school, a student discov-
ers a picture of a girl during an exam looking 
over the shoulder of her classmate, with the ac-
companying text: “Cheating, in any form, is 
bad for your self-esteem.” 
In another chapter in the 
book is a photograph of a 
young girl who is stealing 
from a store, while the next 
picture shows two other 
people watching her and 
recording it on camera. 
The accompanying text says, “One way to test 
the impact a decision will have on your feeling of 
self-worth is to imagine a picture being taken of 
you implementing your decision.”45 The ethical 
argument of these instructions is clear—the chil-
dren are not led to believe that cheating or steal-
ing are objectively wrong because they violate a 
universal law. Cheating is wrong because it calls 
forth an unpleasant feeling or threatens the self-
confidence of an individual. Such an argument is 
almost amusing to someone who grew up under 
a totalitarian regime in the seventies and eight-
ies. In a culture deformed by Communist ideol-
ogy, people felt downright happy if they could 
manage to steal from the state-owned property, 
or at least get around some law. After all, the best 
people—from a moral perspective—were usually 
“illegal” or in prison or exile. Things are different 
now in both the East and the West. The “feeling” 
argument no longer works today—the number of 
individuals whose self-esteem would be lowered 
by being exposed as a person who committed an 
unethical act is rapidly declining everywhere.
Subjectivism, which is behind the therapeu-
tic concepts of pedagogy, has a direct connection 
with the “cultures” of ethical utilitarianism and 
emotivism (sometimes called expressionism). In 
utilitarianism, moral discourse determines the 
logic of expediency and usefulness; in emotion-
A whole generation of children 
have been fooled by its moral 
relativism and are now unable 
to recognize the good from 
the bad.
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alism, the logic of psychological well-being. In 
both cases, it is the individual I who arbitrates 
moral prudence. In this frame of reference, the 
most important moral act is that of choice, mak-
ing a decision—not a decision for something, just 
making a decision, period, and deciding it your-
self—Jean Paul Sartre in pedagogical robes. 
The results? Therapeutic pedagogies have 
achieved their goals; and in doing so, they have 
become part of the problem they wanted to solve. 
The therapeutically raised generation is truly au-
tonomous, at least to the extent that they have 
ruled out any commitment that would go be-
yond the borders of subjective choice and personal 
well-being. It is the logical result of programmatic 
questioning of objective moral reality. If I am be-
ing convinced that the final arbiter of moral val-
ues is me or my feelings, eventually I will believe 
it. If I am methodically urged to self-identify my 
existence through free choice, I will eventually do 
it. Who would have expected that, entirely freely, 
I would choose evil? But it could have been ex-
pected—at least since Zimbardo and Milgram.46 
But before them, Dostoyevsky already said it; and 
before him, Aquinas, Augustine, Paul of Tarsus, 
and many others.
In Place of Conclusion: The Abolition of Man 
Many of the problems of the therapeu-
tic approach were uniquely dealt with by C. S. 
Lewis in his book The Abolition of Man, sub-
titled Reflections on education with special refer-
ence to the teaching of English in the upper forms 
of schools. Lewis’s treatise crosses lines not only 
in its form—concise, intense, brief, and all with 
typical Lewis readability—but most of all in that 
Lewis almost prophetically predicted the moral 
problems that came later. Most observers or crit-
ics—including those I refer to here—normally 
analyze the results of some phenomenon, but 
Lewis, with unprecedented foresight, presented a 
description of what was yet to come. Therefore, 
he deserves special attention in the conclusion of 
this paper. 
The text of the book is based on three lec-
tures Lewis gave in 1943.47 Lewis is reacting to 
a textbook on the English language which—so 
it wouldn’t offend anyone—was hidden under 
the designation “green book” by the pseudony-
mous authors “Gaius and Titus.” It was a book 
written in 1939 called The Control of Language: A 
Critical Approach to Reading and Writing, by Alex 
King and Martin Ketley. Lewis analyzes the way 
in which the authors of the textbook subvert the 
students’ values—not only the moral ones. When 
a value statement is made, such as “that waterfall 
is beautiful,” the authors teach that it is only the 
subjective statement of a specific feeling on the 
part of the observer, not a statement about objec-
tive reality. We think we’re saying something im-
portant about something real, but we are actually 
only saying something about our own feelings, 
claim the authors. Lewis argues that such sub-
jectivism in value judgments is flawed because 
some subjects and some acts are actually real; 
that is, they are objective and deserve an evalu-
ation, whether positive or negative. A waterfall is 
objectively beautiful, a villain is objectively evil. 
Understandably, an ethics which doesn’t believe 
in the reality of objective moral values will avoid 
the concepts of good and evil. But if we replace 
“good” with predicates like “necessary,” “progres-
sive,” or “impressive,” we are using just a trick of 
language, a linguistic ruse, says Lewis, who ex-
plains with the questions “necessary for what? 
progressing towards what? effecting what? In the 
last resort they [Gaius and Titus] would have to 
admit that some state of affairs was in their opin-
ion good for its own sake.” In other words—it 
is good to call things by their right names and 
cultivate an “ethics without predicates.” 
According to Lewis, this ethics has been well 
taught by good teachers from time immemorial. 
Lewis reminds us of the thinkers of antiquity 
such as Plato, Aristotle and Augustine, who, in 
one way or another, cultivated “ordinate affec-
tions,” that is, teaching people to love that which 
ought to be loved and to hate that which ought to 
be hated—to love good and hate evil. Although 
moral feelings and values are real, they don’t de-
velop automatically in people, says Lewis. Hence 
the need for education. Those who don’t have 
these moral capacities are lacking the very thing 
that would make them specifically human. They 
would be, in Lewis’s words, “men without chests” 
or “without hearts.” The Gaius and Titus book 
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produces such people by undermining the fact 
that people are capable of contact with objec-
tive reality (moral, aesthetic or other) and thus 
taking away from them that which is humanely 
the most valuable. (If such people were asked, 
“Do you think there is something real outside 
of you—truth, goodness, beauty, the noumena?” 
they would answer, “No—there’s only you, the 
subject, your impression, 
phenomena, illusion.”) 
What will happen with 
the human world when we 
explain away and thus do-
mesticate moral reality? In 
the last part of his book, 
Lewis gives an unbeliev-
ably accurate sketch of the 
contours of the modern 
dystopia that should soon 
emerge if this demoralizing trend were tp con-
tinue. The power of human beings to do exactly 
what they wish will grow with the so-called “con-
quest of nature,” that is, the development of the 
natural sciences. However, every new power ac-
quired by Man is, at the same time, “power over 
man,” says Lewis. Therefore, it is good to ask 
whose power grows with every further sublima-
tion of nature. Lewis predicts that if the dream of 
some scientists becomes a reality and we humans 
“take control of nature,” it will mean the suprem-
acy of hundreds of people over billions of others. 
The final stage of conquest will be conquest of 
one’s self, that is, human nature. Human nature 
will be the final bastion of the natural world that 
will be conquered. The victorious ruling minor-
ity will become a caste of Conditioners, that 
is, people who will have control tools (he men-
tions eugenetics, genetics and psychology) and 
who will knead, form, and cut out the nature of 
the succeeding generations however they want: 
“The process which, if not checked, will abol-
ish Man goes on apace among Communists and 
Democrats no less than among Fascists,” warns 
Lewis, I remind the reader, in  1943. He adds, 
“The methods may (at first) differ in brutality. 
[…] The belief that we can invent ideologies at 
pleasure, and the consequent treatment of man-
kind as mere specimens, preparations, begins 
to affect our very language.” 48 Man’s conquest 
of Nature turns out to be Nature’s conquest of 
Man. Man’s power over everything destroys him.
Lewis called the process of conquering, when 
people sacrifice one thing after another, and fi-
nally even themselves, in order to gain power 
over nature and human nature, a “magician’s 
bargain.” Faust’s metaphor illustrates the fact 
that modern “science” has 
the same goal as the an-
cient magic, which is the 
submission of reality to the 
wishes of humankind—to 
command the wind and 
the rain, to gain that hid-
eous strength,49 which is in 
fact to become a god. To 
achieve their goal, they use 
magic and science to do 
things that have long been considered “disgust-
ing and impious.” 
The same applies to moral values and princi-
ples. If they are conquered, people will have the 
power to freely modify, design, and even produce 
them. Moral values and ethics are not things 
that determine a person, but things that persons 
themselves determine however they see fit, a situ-
ation that means the end of them. And this is the 
“tragi-comedy of our situation,” Lewis concludes: 
we call loudly for precisely those qualities that we 
ourselves have subverted: “In a sort of ghastly sim-
plicity we remove the organ and demand the func-
tion. We make men without chests and expect of 
them virtue and enterprise. We laugh at honor and 
are shocked to find traitors in our midst. We cas-
trate and bid the geldings be fruitful.”50
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The Common Thread in 




“We see and understand things not as they 
are but as we are.” ~Anthony de Mello—
Awareness (1990)
Christian mystic Anthony de Mello illustrates 
today’s postmodern view of reality. He seems to 
say that truth and reality are autonomous, sub-
jective constructions in the eye of the beholder. 
Thus, Truth claims cannot be judged as true in 
all contexts for all times but are relative to some 
frame of reference like personal perception, lan-
guage, or culture. 
The idea that subjectivity influences the way 
we interpret the world is not new; neither is the 
idea that subjective factors influence the meth-
ods, discoveries, and applications of human col-
lective efforts. Over the last half-century, the 
bastion of objective reason has been crumbling at 
its Enlightenment foundation. Fatal blows have 
come from insights in psychology and the phi-
losophy of science. Although modern positivis-
tic science has been mortally wounded, I believe 
an integrative approach can be taken between a 
strong relativistic position on truth and an abso-
lutist one. The Christian faith as a worldview le-
gitimizes the assertion that there is a “real world” 
as well as the belief that we perceive it through 
interpretive lenses, which I will be calling “inter-
pretive frameworks.” These frameworks can yield 
a plurality of views, including imperfect ones. 
The goal of this paper is to explore the con-
flict between the relativistic and absolutist posi-
tions on truth, using insights from cognitive psy-
chology, philosophy of science, and Christianity. 
First, I will highlight how subjectivity takes 
place at the level of the individual, as described 
by schema theory. Second, I will show that the 
same cognitive process lies at the heart of human 
social efforts via shared interpretive frameworks 
often called “paradigms.” And third, I will ad-
dress the glaring implication of such subjectiv-
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ity. If individuals and groups interpret the world 
via their own subjective frameworks, the result is 
relativism, which is antithetical to objective ab-
solute truth that stands firm across all times and 
contexts. I will argue that Christian worldview 
philosophy helps resolve the apparent conflict 
based upon the biblical insight that the way we 
see and understand real-
ity stems ultimately from 
the condition of our heart. 
Interpretive frameworks 
are fundamental to human 
nature, and embracing 
their role in human func-
tioning poses no threat to 




 At the heart of schema theory is the relative 
nature of human sensory perception. The claim 
that the process of perception is not an exact 
match of the original sensation from the external 
world originates with Immanuel Kant.1 This idea 
was given experimental support in the late 1800s 
by the founder of psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, 
who researched psychophysics in Germany.2 For 
example, I use this demonstration to illustrate 
how perception is relative. I place two buckets of 
water in front of the class, one with ice. I ask a 
volunteer willing to get his or her hand wet, to 
rate, on a scale of 1 to 10, the temperature of the 
bucket without ice. This contains cold tap water, 
and the student usually rates it as a 3 or 4. Next, 
I have the student rate the ice water—using the 
same hand—which usually receives an emphatic 
rating of 1! I then instruct the student to quickly 
put his or her hand back into first bucket and rate 
the water anew. The student surprisingly says, “It 
feels like a 6 or 7.” This response reveals that per-
ception is relative and is more dependent upon 
the current skin temperature than upon the tem-
perature of the stimulus. The point is that, at an 
individual level, we are bound by an interpreta-
tion process that is relative to individual experi-
ence.
Over the years this idea has been used to ex-
plain a variety of phenomena—especially in 
memory research and cognitive development. The 
result has been a theory explaining that subjective 
interpretive frameworks are used to see and under-
stand the world. Today we call this theory “sche-
ma theory,” the name originating from Kant.3 
Over the last century, key European psycholo-
gists, including Frederick 
Bartlett and Jean Piaget, 
have articulated and ap-
plied this idea. Bartlett con-
cluded that memory is a re-
construction of interaction 
with the environment that 
involves pre-set schemata 
or frameworks that guide 
both memory storage and 
recall.4 Piaget took the idea 
of interpretive frameworks 
beyond memory processing and articulated an en-
tire theory of cognitive development based upon 
their role in organizing all experience.5 
When the “cognitive revolution” took place 
in American psychology in the late 1960s,6  the 
mantle was taken up by many, including Ulrich 
Neisser, who speculated that mental cognitive 
schemata result from actual physical processes in 
the nervous system.7
Schema theory has even been explanatory in 
the research areas of artificial intelligence, neural 
network theory, and neuroscience, by theorists 
including Michael Arbib.8 Arbib believes that 
schema theory is the best explanation for going 
beyond the structure of the brain to an under-
standing of the function of it.9 
In recent decades, many researchers have con-
firmed that schemata serve as frameworks that 
guide interpretation. This confirmation has been 
shown in domains such as story recall,10 text com-
prehension, and speed of recall,11 linguistics,12 
visual learning,13 cultural differences in cogni-
tion,14 computational cognition,15 and problem 
solving16 and has been applied widely in various 
disciplines, including education.17
The work by Wundt, Bartlett, Piaget, Neisser 
and Arbib shows how our cognition is an inher-
ently subjective process. It is the interplay of an 
individual’s sensation and perception and the re-
Although modern positivistic 
science has been mortally 
wounded, I believe an 
integrative approach can 
be taken between a strong 
relativistic position on truth 
and an absolutist one. 
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ality of his or her environment. However, the role 
of interpretive frameworks does not end here at 
the individual level, but it extends to how mean-
ing is shared and understood collectively. The 
same cognitive process lies at the core of human 
social efforts. Shared interpretive frameworks 
function in ways that yield collective subjectivity.
Collective Subjectivity
Humans are social creatures, dependent upon 
the structures of family, society, and culture. 
Given this social dependency, it makes sense that 
the use of interpretive frameworks would have a 
social counterpart seen in groups.
The idea was anticipated first in the 1930s by 
Lev Vygotsky’s sociocultural view of cognition. 
Vygotsky claimed inter-dependence between 
individual cognition and the social context in 
which it takes place.18 This view, that a type of 
collective interpretive framework guides group or 
social functioning, has been articulated in disci-
plines beyond the social sciences, most notably in 
the history and philosophy of science. 
Over the last half-century, much investiga-
tion has looked at the social structure of science. 
The findings have underscored the role of sub-
jectivity in scientific activity, in contrast to the 
modernist mindset, which sees science as a purely 
objective endeavor. The overarching consensus of 
this work has been that groups of scientists func-
tion under a type of conceptual structure that 
orients their work. This structure is subject to 
non-science-related influences, such as aesthetics, 
persuasion, and personalities. Although there is 
controversy as to who should get credit for the 
originality of some of his concepts,19 none can 
deny that Thomas Kuhn’s book The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions20 has been one of the most 
important works published on the topic in the 
last half-century.21 
Human Science Guided by Paradigms
Kuhn articulated a new way for understand-
ing scientific progress. He argued that a linear 
progression of discovery upon discovery—ac-
cumulating objective knowledge—was insuffi-
cient for describing how science actually works. 
He proposed a model describing science as un-
predictable and irregular. Rather than a vertical, 
linear process, he suggested more of a horizontal 
one of skips and jumps within a single plane, mo-
tivated not by anything objective but by subjec-
tive, socially-driven factors, such as personality, 
prestige, and aesthetics. He even used the reli-
gious term of “faith” and the metaphor of “con-
version” to describe how an individual scientist 
jumps allegiance from one view to another. 
Kuhn’s basic concept for describing science 
centers on the notion of a paradigm. A para-
digm is a collective conceptual framework that 
includes a complicated mixture of assumptions, 
theories, and hypotheses accepted by the group 
that establish a type of unconscious perimeter 
within which scientific investigation takes place. 
Progress is better seen as growth in depth rather 
than growth in breadth. Science is like digging 
a well straight down within a defined perimeter.
Although not always known by those work-
ing in it, the perimeter of the paradigm is limit-
ed. Nature, however, is not so limited; therefore, 
some discoveries do not fit within the boundar-
ies of the tight-knit paradigm. Someone digging 
near the edge may accidentally dig beyond the 
boundary. Kuhn calls such findings “anomalies.” 
They are often ignored and swept under the rug 
by those who discover them—unless they recur 
enough to create a crisis within the paradigm: a 
state of tension for anomalies that can no longer 
be ignored. When the paradigm can no longer 
provide a comprehensive explanatory framework, 
that paradigm must give way to another para-
digm in order to accommodate the new data. 
This giving way shifts the discipline to a com-
pletely different and seemingly incompatible 
paradigm. Kuhn calls this change a “paradigm 
shift,” or a “revolution”—a process of demolition 
and reconstruction—in contrast to the tradition-
al modernist view of gradual, vertical, linear, and 
harmonious progress.
Kuhn points to a gestalt switch (like a 3D 
Necker cube drawing) as an analogy to describe 
this process, where a single set of data can be 
perceived in two completely different ways—but 
only one way at a time. Kuhn’s description un-
derscores the idea that humans are subjective in 
their collective interpretation of even scientific 
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facts, guided by a collective interpretive frame-
work. 
Frameworks Do Not Yield Relativism
So far, we have seen two similar descriptions 
of how humans understand and experience the 
world, both individually and collectively—via 
individual and shared interpretive frameworks: 
cognitive structures of belief and expectations 
that guide the interpretation of reality. Each de-
scription highlights subjectivity in contrast to the 
objectivity of traditional 
modernism. 
The subjective and non-
cumulative process dis-
cussed by Kuhn, and also 
by others such as Polanyi22 
in the 1960s, took direct 
aim at modernism’s objec-
tive impartiality and began, in part, to usher in 
post modernity. The knee-jerk reaction by many 
in science, as well as in Christianity, has been to 
resist the sea change to postmodernism. Some 
have critiqued this change as relativism and anti-
science.23 Christians have resisted such new ideas 
too because of the danger of runaway relativism. 
Such a view seems to undermine the Christian 
conviction of absolute truth’s flowing from an 
almighty sovereign God, who is objectively real.
Granted, the views presented allow for rela-
tive interpretation by individuals and groups, 
but I believe that neither should be classified as 
endorsing postmodern relativism, which denies 
the existence of absolute truth. Correctly under-
stood, interpretive frameworks, such as schemata 
and paradigms, are each quite compatible with 
objective, absolute reality. 
Schemata: Basis For Relativity?
Taking the ideas from cognitive psychology 
or philosophy of science to an extreme, we find 
that it does look like postmodern relativism. Yes, 
human perceptual systems “construct” an under-
standing of the world that does not always match 
reality. Yes, humans mentally construct schemata 
that guide perception. Yes, collective thinking or 
paradigms seem to be exclusively mind-depen-
dent and subjective—apart from the objective 
world. 
Looking closely, however, we find that nei-
ther view negates reality itself. Rather than see-
ing these conflicting paradigms as supporting the 
idea that reality is only in the eye of the beholder, 
we should conclude that the interpretation of re-
ality is what is in the eye of the beholder. This lat-
ter statement more clearly highlights the role of 
our imperfect perception and cognition as they 
interact with the real world, rather than claiming 
that reality itself is malleable.
Our view should be 
that a real world exists, 
and that experiences, based 
firmly in that real world, 
can nonetheless be inter-
preted and understood dif-
ferently, given the particu-
lar framework (i.e., schema 
or paradigm). John Searle articulates a similar 
view. He presents a satisfying alternative to the 
old modernist view as well as to the prevailing 
postmodern constructionist and deconstruction-
ist views, which both deny any ultimate real-
ity.24 Searle suggests that two types of facts ex-
ist: “brute” facts, which are independent of what 
humans think about them (such as that Mount 
Everest has snow), and “social” facts, which are 
humanly constructed and conceived individually 
or institutionally (such as a piece of paper is a $5 
bill). This position affirms that which cognitive 
schema theory and philosophers of science, like 
Kuhn, contend: that a true reality exists and that 
humans develop interpretive frameworks with 
which they interpret that reality.
Illusory Schema Conflict: 
When relativity is an illusion 
One important point to highlight is that 
sometimes what looks like relativism is only an 
illusion. Regarding the function of schemata as 
they guide individual understanding, I see two 
aspects of the process that can yield what I term 
“illusory schema conflict.” The first deals with 
multiple exemplars of a single concept, while the 
other draws attention to the possibility of mul-
tiple interpretations of a single exemplar.  
Let me illustrate the first with the tallest 
Correctly understood, 
interpretive frameworks, such 
as schemata and paradigms, 
are each quite compatible with 
objective, absolute reality.
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mountain question. If I asked, “What is the tall-
est mountain on Earth?” most would say Mount 
Everest in Nepal and China—it stands over 
29,000 feet above sea level. However, is Mount 
Everest really the tallest mountain on Earth? If 
we invoke different schemata to define the con-
cept of “tallest mountain,” there can be a plural-
ity of correct answers: 
• Tallest from its base below sea level (un-
der water): Mauna Kea in Hawaii, 33,480 
feet.
• Tallest rising from ocean floor: Mount 
Lamlam, Guam, 37,820 feet from the 
Mariana Trench
• Tallest from center of the earth: Mount 
Chimborazo in Ecuador, over 20 million 
feet.
The use of different schemata underscores 
the role of definition and context. Interpersonal 
misunderstandings are often caused by this type 
of schema conflict. Two different interpretive 
frameworks are correctly used, but they come 
to disparate conclusions. These differences show 
that sometimes differences may be due not to 
whether someone is wrong or right but simply to 
the fact that more than one point of view is vi-
able. 
The second type of schema conflict occurs 
when differing schemata are derived honestly 
from a single exemplar. An illustration of this is 
the ancient parable from India about six blind 
men walking who encounter an obstacle in their 
path. As each reaches out to touch what is in his 
way, the six have an awful argument because 
none can agree on what it is. One says it’s a spear, 
another says it is a hose, while yet another claims 
it is a fan. The fourth declares it is a wall, but 
another claims it is a pillar, and the last is con-
vinced it is a rope with a brush on its end. What 
they have encountered? The moral derived is that 
there are many ways to describe an elephant and 
that individual perception is limited. Some argue 
that this parable illustrates relativity—that each 
man experienced his own truth, valid for him 
and not the others. However, I suggest a more 
cryptic meaning. Yes, each man’s framework was 
different from that of the others, but the six views 
actually come together to form a more complete 
whole. 
This way of looking at the story highlights 
a distinction between the two types of schema 
conflict. The first, illustrated by the mountain 
story, affirms the multiplicity of truth, mediated 
by context, while the elephant story shows that a 
grand truth may lie behind multiple interpreta-
tions. This latter example emphasizes how seem-
ingly differing views may actually come together 
to provide a more complete understanding. The 
apostle Paul makes a similar point in Romans 
and I Corinthians when he explains that al-
though there are many separate parts of the body, 
they function together as a whole.25 This princi-
ple applies not only to the physical body and the 
Church of Jesus Christ but also to human cogni-
tive function.
In both cases of illusory schema conflict, the 
conflict seems to reveal incompatible ways of un-
derstanding when, in actuality, the conflicting 
schemata or views can be shown to be simultane-
ously totally true.
This raises the question of whether we, indi-
vidually or collectively, are capable of seeing be-
yond our own interpretive frameworks to perceive 
the whole. No doubt, this perception of the whole 
might be possible, but probably not in all circum-
stances because we have been created with lim-
its: normative limits imposed simply by the fact 
that we are created creatures and by the intrusion 
and distortion of sin.26 Both types of limitations 
probably play a role in obstructing our view of the 
whole. I speculate that some portions of our lim-
ited view, specifically those due to the distortion 
of sin, are potentially fixable, or at least partially, 
via sanctification; but post-consummation, some 
of these limits will be entirely gone, and we will 
experience knowledge of the true-for-all-time, 
uber-framework.
An Uber-framework?
An uber-framework is the idea that there ex-
ists an overarching metanarrative that gives ulti-
mate meaning to varying and sometimes seem-
ingly disparate cultural and/or individual nar-
ratives. Several Christian scholars have argued 
for the existence of such a superior framework.27 
For example, Roy Clouser makes a case for an 
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est mountain on Earth?” most would say Mount 
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The use of different schemata underscores 
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misunderstandings are often caused by this type 
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frameworks are correctly used, but they come 
to disparate conclusions. These differences show 
that sometimes differences may be due not to 
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and not the others. However, I suggest a more 
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actually come together to form a more complete 
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This way of looking at the story highlights 
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conflict. The first, illustrated by the mountain 
story, affirms the multiplicity of truth, mediated 
by context, while the elephant story shows that a 
grand truth may lie behind multiple interpreta-
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to provide a more complete understanding. The 
apostle Paul makes a similar point in Romans 
and I Corinthians when he explains that al-
though there are many separate parts of the body, 
they function together as a whole.25 This princi-
ple applies not only to the physical body and the 
Church of Jesus Christ but also to human cogni-
tive function.
In both cases of illusory schema conflict, the 
conflict seems to reveal incompatible ways of un-
derstanding when, in actuality, the conflicting 
schemata or views can be shown to be simultane-
ously totally true.
This raises the question of whether we, indi-
vidually or collectively, are capable of seeing be-
yond our own interpretive frameworks to perceive 
the whole. No doubt, this perception of the whole 
might be possible, but probably not in all circum-
stances because we have been created with lim-
its: normative limits imposed simply by the fact 
that we are created creatures and by the intrusion 
and distortion of sin.26 Both types of limitations 
probably play a role in obstructing our view of the 
whole. I speculate that some portions of our lim-
ited view, specifically those due to the distortion 
of sin, are potentially fixable, or at least partially, 
via sanctification; but post-consummation, some 
of these limits will be entirely gone, and we will 
experience knowledge of the true-for-all-time, 
uber-framework.
An Uber-framework?
An uber-framework is the idea that there ex-
ists an overarching metanarrative that gives ulti-
mate meaning to varying and sometimes seem-
ingly disparate cultural and/or individual nar-
ratives. Several Christian scholars have argued 
for the existence of such a superior framework.27 
For example, Roy Clouser makes a case for an 
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overarching framework that subsumes both pure 
Aristotelian objectivity and Kantian subjectivity 
and provides a third alternative: that ultimate 
knowledge lies with God alone. Clouser suggests 
that there exists an overarching uber-framework, 
albeit in the mind of God alone, that subsumes 
all others.28
This idea has been articulated by many in the 
context of worldview philosophy, particularly by 
Christians who believe that in God lies ultimate 
truth, or the true worldview of worldviews—the 
uber-framework. In my 
judgment, the concept 
paradigm that we have 
described thus far in the 
context of the philosophy 
of science is identical in 
essence and function with 
the concept of worldview 
that has been articulated 
by many Christian phi-
losophers. 
Christian Worldview Philosophy
In David Naugle’s in-depth look at the con-
cept of worldview, he traces the idea of an over-
arching worldview that explains all reality—back 
to the Reformation writings of John Calvin and 
then, in the late 1800s, to Scottish theologian 
James Orr and Dutch theologian Abraham 
Kuyper.29 As the more well-known of these two, 
Kuyper’s version will be described briefly.
Kuyperian Worldview Philosophy
Kuyper is known for applying Calvinism to 
everyday life, focusing on the sovereignty of the 
God of the Bible over all aspects of reality: cos-
mos, culture and thought. Calvin believed that 
God revealed Himself to humans via the created 
order, as well as through the Bible, the infallible 
and inerrant words written under the influence of 
the Holy Spirit. Of these two revelations, Calvin 
gave priority to the Bible when he used the meta-
phor of the Scriptures being spectacles through 
which humans are to interpret and understand 
the rest of God’s creation.30 In other words, 
Calvin claimed that God, as sovereign creator 
of all things, is the ultimate source of all knowl-
edge and Truth and that the Bible is a direct filter 
for Truth. Kuyper believed that people can and 
should understand Christianity as a holistic and 
comprehensive philosophy of life rather than as 
just one compartmental aspect of human experi-
ence.31, 32 
This is where Kuyper highlights world-
view as a type of interpretive framework. The 
term itself is translated from the German word 
Weltanschauung, which means “a particular way 
of looking at the world.” The term originates 
with Kant, as we saw with 
the term schema.33 Since his 
time, it has come to mean 
a set of underlying assump-
tions that define the spirit 
of the age or the particular 
way a culture manifests it-
self in literature, art, philos-
ophy, and science. Kuyper 
used the term to suggest 
that multiple worldviews 
can co-exist and be in conflict with one another 
while competing for people’s allegiance.
In his day, Kuyper identified two oppos-
ing “faiths,” or worldviews, that were in direct 
conflict: modernism versus Christianity. Kuyper 
suggested that the conflict resulted ultimately 
from Adam and Eve’s fall in to sin. The Fall pro-
duced an antithesis, or tension between God and 
idolatry (or evil), that is manifested in all human 
endeavors. Relating this antithesis to science, for 
example, Naugle states, 
Kuyper argues [that]… regenerate people 
with a Christian worldview produce a … the-
istic interpretation of science, and non-regen-
erate people with a non-Christian worldview 
produce an idolatrous science …. Scientific 
reason is not the same for all people. It de-
pends upon whether or not the scientist has 
or has not been religiously renewed. There 
is not a neutral scientific rationality leading 
to certain objective and shared conclusions. 
Instead, scientific theories are a function of 
the religious backgrounds and philosophical 
orientations of the scientists or theorists.34 
It is important to point out that the conflict 
is not in the science itself but in the conclusions 
An uber-framework is the idea 
that there exists an overarching 
metanarrative that gives 
ultimate meaning to varying 
and sometimes seemingly 
disparate cultural and/or 
individual narratives.
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made (i.e., interpretation and application). 
Kuyper is basically arguing that collective 
interpretive frameworks function in society. 
His argument is similar to our earlier descrip-
tion of collective cognition as seemingly relative. 
But Kuyper’s Christian worldview philosophy is 
clearly based on a belief that there is a real creator, 
God, who is objectively manifest in the material 
creation as well as in the Bible. Both realms are 
objectively true. But seeming relativity comes 
into Kuyper’s thought when he claims that there 
are different interpretations of that reality: “ab-
normal” and “normal,” as he termed them.35 
Those who are regenerated by the power of God’s 
Holy Spirit are given a new outlook, which al-
lows them to understand that the cosmos is in 
an abnormal state due to sin and in need of re-
demption through Jesus Christ, but those who 
are unregenerate see all as normal and see the 
need for Christ as folly. The result is a difference 
in interpretation of a single reality, not a differ-
ence between two constructed realities that are 
mutually exclusive. 
One implication from Christian Worldview 
philosophy is that God’s reality is the uber-frame-
work—the true paradigm or schemata, the only 
correct interpretation—and that human access 
to the framework is only possible by regenera-
tion of the Holy Spirit. The reverse implication is 
that without God’s action, flawed frameworks or 
wrong schemata, paradigms, or worldviews exist, 
leading to framework errors at all levels. 
Another implication is that because the Holy 
Spirit’s regeneration focuses inwardly, we may 
need to consider that our interpretive frameworks 
are more than cognitive. Recently, some have be-
gun to critique36 the idea of worldview as a static, 
theoretical, and cognitive process and to direct 
us to see our interpretive frameworks as coming 
from the heart—which encompasses our identity 
more holistically.37 For example, Jamie Smith 
suggests that when talking about worldview, we 
need to move to a more non-cognitive, affective 
model, which includes our cares, concerns, mo-
tivations, and desires.38 Based upon insight from 
Esther Meek,39 Naugle argues that “the heart 
needs to be rooted in the physical body…and an-
chored in the ebb and flow of the real world,”40 
meaning that knowing with the heart, which is 
the center of human consciousness, involves the 
totality of our being. This is where our individual 
cognitive schemata intermingle with our collec-
tive paradigms and worldviews and guide us in 
holistic biological, psychological, and social con-
sciousness. 
Conclusion
The interpretive frameworks we have looked 
at (cognitive schemata, paradigms, and world-
views) seem to all function in a common way—
as filters to help us understand the world around 
us. This way of human perception seems to be by 
design. God created us to gain individual and so-
cial knowledge through interpretive frameworks. 
These frameworks provide a starting point as well 
as an important heuristic for our exploration and 
progress in fulfilling the cultural mandate.41 
One aspect of this design is clear: there are 
limitations. We are limited perceivers but will 
someday be freed from at least part of the limita-
tion. Human nature is restricted in that we are 
creatures created by God and, as such, will never 
apprehend fully the true uber-worldview, which 
is known by God alone. We all are affected by the 
distortion of sin, which implies that some of the 
subjectivity of our cognitive perceptions is due to 
sin. This distortion explains why errors happen at 
all levels of our interpretive frameworks. 
The Christian’s hope is that Christ’s redemp-
tive work of restoration will yield for us a more 
complete way of knowing at His second coming. 
As the apostle Paul said, “Now I know in part; 
then I shall know fully.” We have confidence that 
part of the limitation in our ability to know will 
be removed. 
Perhaps without sin’s effect upon our inter-
pretive frameworks, we may share a common 
perceptual organization, language, culture, para-
digm, and worldview. Having a shared interpre-
tive framework seems consistent with the bibli-
cal theme of restoration. Recall that the origin 
of multiple languages and culture groups came 
from God’s judgment of sin at the Tower of 
Babel. Perhaps God will bring “heart” and “cog-
nitive” unity to all the diverse nations who occu-
py the new Jerusalem by establishing a common 
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set of interpretive frameworks for all its citizens. 
The biblical narrative of creation, fall, redemp-
tion, and consummation is the human entrance 
into God’s true worldview, the uber-framework, 
where God’s people will know more fully, which 
may mean to know in the same way from percept 
to thought to culture. When that day arrives, we 
all, including Anthony de Mello, will no longer 
see and understand things as we were, but will 
see and understand them as God intended, as 
they truly are.
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Craig Bartholomew’s IVP Academic publica-
tion, Contours of the Kuyperian Tradition (2017), 
is indeed a magisterial systematic introduction 
to the cloud of witnesses (and many fellow trav-
elers) who have articulated a basically biblical, 
Jean Calvinian, committed world-and-life vi-
sion on how to live before God’s face until Jesus 
Christ comes again to complete historically the 
Kingdom-Rule of God (Psalm 110, Acts 1:3, 
Hebrews 10:19-12:29) in this world, which be-
longs to the holy Triune Sovereign Creator God 
revealed in the Scriptures. 
A difficulty of passing on such a 
Reformational-perspective pair of glasses from 
one older generation to the next younger genera-
tion is that its visionary contour is less defined 
than a philosophical one, and it is also often sub-
verted by the primal Way-of-life which always 
underlies us humans, who consciously have (or 
do not have) a “Weltanschauung.”1 To “retrieve 
and renew” a life-guiding (Kuyperian) tradition 
is not like excavating certain ideas as if they be 
stones and then rebuilding anew the old ruined 
house we once lived in, especially if Edward Shils 
is correct in saying, “A tradition once it has re-
ceded from regular usage cannot be deliberately 
restored.”2 The usual resulting “Neo-” character 
of such a maneuver tends, in my judgment, to be 
artificial, at best a beautiful bouquet of cut flow-
ers.
What would it take, God willing, to foster a 
vital Kuyperian tradition in the consciousness of 
the coming generation that is not handicapped by 
being “Neo-Kuyperian”? I will offer two sugges-
tions for our discussion: (1) A Kuyperian world-
and-life vision has a supple, not analytically de-
fined but imaginative, literarily composed char-
acter; and (2) our program should be to discover 
anew, reformingly embody, and freely share the 
Kuyperian-spirited constellation of insights with 
our neighbors, focused on their actual needs.
My own practice is to talk about a “commit-
ted world-and-life vision” instead of the trun-
cated Weltanschauung, worldview.3 Talk about 
WANTED: Vegetarian 
Kuyperians with Artistic 
Underwear
by Calvin Seerveld
Dr. Calvin Seerveld is husband to Ines Naudin ten Cate; 
their three children are Dordt graduates. He is Senior 
Member emeritus in Philosophical Aesthetics at the 
Graduate Institute for Christian Studies in Toronto. 
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“worldview” omits the element of life praxis—
which Kuyper’s original Dutch phrase “levens-
en-wereld beschouwing” highlighted! The odd 
term of “life-system,” which Kuyper used in the 
1898 Stone lectures, shows the importance of 
“life” to him; but “system,” I think, overstates 
the kind of cohering form belonging to a synop-
tic vision.4 I use “vision” partly because of Ezra 
Pound’s wise dictum, “Don’t be viewy,”5 vague, 
muddled, obscure, “worldviewish.”
However, I do believe it 
is proper for a committed 
world-and-life vision tradi-
tion not to be theoretically 
conceptually exact. The 
intelligible contour pre-
sented by S.G. de Graaf’s 
Ve r b o n d s g e s c h i e d e n i s 
(1936)6 has an unmistak-
able redemptive-historical visionary Gestalt that 
is richly biblical, but strict theological jargon I 
find absent. Thomas Cole’s painterly series of four 
large canvases narrating our human Voyage of 
Life (1842)7 convincingly articulates the Horatio 
Alger American Dream world-and-life vision of 
greatness that is Neo-Idealistically attractive and 
hollow as hell. Bertolt Brecht’s oeuvre depicts 
and champions a pragmatistic survival ethic that 
promises an everlasting bitter-sweet meaning in a 
kind of inverted Nietzschean tradition. 
That is, it helps me to understand the bulky 
nature and power of the Kuyperian tradition if 
I realize that the cosmic scope but non-philo-
sophical rigor to its perspective has the nature of 
literate precision. Literary precision is not analyti-
cally tight, but the right word like “woebegone” 
or “bluster” can call up a florescent peacock tail 
of nuances that nevertheless can catch precisely a 
rich reality at hand. When Shakespeare’s Lady 
Macbeth utters “Out, damned spot! Out, I say!” 
(Macbeth, V.1), she is not everyday swearing and 
is also not just carefully confessing “I committed 
intentional first degree murder.” But the theatri-
cal saying has a bloody, down-to-earth, cry-to-
heaven, spirited specificity that is not scientifically 
precise but is aesthetically lucid, engaging, over-
whelming (as in Jesus’ parables, with the crooked 
tax collector praying, “God, be merciful to me, a 
sinner” [Luke 18:9-14]).
Now, if a committed world-and-life visionary 
tradition—Nietzschean, American Dream, or 
Christian Kuyperian—“is the structured trans-
action of passing on wonts from practiced to in-
experienced human hands,”8 we have a sure guide 
to the enormous challenge we face, because “the 
wonts” of the Kuyperian tradition are as varied as 
creaturely life. 
We will need the daily practice of attent, 
connecting Bible read-
ing at family meals; a 
regular healthy diet of 
body-building grains and 
greens, without a constant 
gratuitous sugar caress; an 
expectant Sunday worship 
service with a church year 
of solid Scriptural preach-
ing, earnest liturgical confession of sin to be 
forgiven, and joyful, communion-building cel-
ebration of the eucharist. We need to be learn-
ing a trade that fits our gifts and enjoy a week 
of work that somehow serves good to somebody 
and helps pay our bills; a habit of wide reading 
in cultural history and current affairs with wise 
mentors nearby; a circle of friends with the cus-
tom to play games together uncontaminated by 
a competitive mania, where there rises time for 
intimate conversation—it takes an encyclopedic 
range and ensemble of exercised human activi-
ties to show-and-tell, to engender and spread a 
committed world-and-life vision with a special 
(Nietzschean, American Dream or) Kuyperian 
cachet, beyond telling about it. To chant “square 
inch” and “sphere sovereignty” will not keep alive 
the blessing of a reforming Kuyperian tradition, 
since its concatenated wonts are not reducible to 
a few pregnant ideas.9
Would teaching and learning the Refor-
mational Christian philosophical systematics—
of Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd, Zuidema, Mekkes, 
K.J. Popma, H. van Rieseen, H. Evan Runner, 
Robert Knudsen, Peter Steen, Sander Griffioen, 
Edward Schuurman and others, which was and is 
a like-spirited conceptual deepening of this very 
Kuyperian committed world-and-life vision—
help the living propagation of the Kuyperian 
How about proposing that 
artistry should be the underwear, 
at least of the well-dressed 
Kuyperian readied for service in 
God’s world.
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tradition? In my own judgment and experience, 
when a theoretical physicist (Harry van der 
Laan)10 or a political science academic (Bernard 
Zylstra)11 has digested the jargon-invested, basic 
intricacies of the Reformational Christian phi-
losophy, which has embedded in its categorical 
framework and gut a cross-disciplinary avenue for 
communal reflection, then surprising alternative 
scholarship with wisdom can result, like econo-
mist Bob Goudzwaard’s Beyond the Modern Age,12 
and oncologist James Rusthoven’s Covenantal 
Biomedical Ethics for Contemporary Medicine.13 
Educated thinkers whose special field analysis 
and counsel has not been forged with and honed 
by Reformational philosophical hypotheses and 
who don’t think with a committed Kuyperian 
world-and-life vision are too handicapped, I 
think, to be integrally Christian in their profes-
sional theoretical activity. But superficial knowl-
edge of Reformational Christian philosophy is 
not an insurance policy one can cash in for being 
able to speak redemptive knowledge as a banker, 
CEO, pastor, governing official or teacher.
One last comment: since a committed world-
and-life visionary tradition has, to my thinking, 
an imaginative literary consistency, not to say a 
supervening, suggestion-rich, artistic quality, I’d 
like to raise the ante on Kuyper’s well-known 
phrase that “art is no fringe that is attached to the 
garment” of human life.14 How about proposing 
that artistry should be the underwear, at least of 
the well-dressed Kuyperian readied for service in 
God’s world. 
Every mature Kuyperian child of God should 
have underneath his or her visible activity cloth-
ing, I suggest, a supportive fabric of images (like 
Ernst Barlach’s Singing Man, Käthe Kollwitz’s 
Mother with dead child, Rembrandt’s late self-
portraits), an invigorating psalm-song under the 
breath (Genevan 51, 89, 141), a poignant favor-
ite poetic fragment or novel scene remembered 
(Shakespeare’s “Love is not love / Which alters 
when it alteration finds...”; Gwendolyn Brooks, 
“The Old Marrieds”; the severe act of crossing out 
Pieter’s name from the Bible by his father Jakob 
van Vlaanderen, in Alan Paton’s “Too Late the 
Phalarope”); a readiness for gracious, salty speech 
(see parable-speaking Jesus; Colossians 4:6)—all 
of which are conducive to instilling and practic-
ing a vital Kuyperian merciful and just Kingdom 
of God tradition among us. 
Kuyperian Christian schooling would do 
well, it seems to me, to make wearing such un-
derwear training a priority, since the arts are 
among the best resilient, subtle, and invigorating 
carriers of world-and-life visions.15
Could we perhaps tweak the “retrieve and re-
new” formula to discover and absorb, in order to 
give away the Kuyperian tradition as a task for 
promoting shalom? That is, a world-and-life vi-
sion is not so much a deposit you can pick up and 
refurbish, as it is an on-going, blood-coursing, 
world-wide, holding-patterned communal con-
sciousness one inhabits or not.
As I understand it, a “Christian world-and-
life vision is a thetical orientation and not a judg-
mental condemnation; [it is] a program for doing 
good for the commonweal and not a plan of at-
tack on enemies.”16  So it is a joy to give-it-away to 
wandering people who may be at a loss, provided 
you do not come on as Proverbs 27:15 puts it, 
“like the dribbling drivel of a leaky roof on a day 
of pounding rain.” 
If you be a person whose inescapable Way-of-
life has not yet sprung a self-conscious world-and-
life vision, to be introduced to the all-encompass-
ing Kuyperian tradition, as Craig Bartholomew’s 
book does it, can be an exhilarating, eye-opening, 
and life-integrating experience. If you are hold-
ing onto an un-Christian world-and-life vision-
ary tradition, it may take something more like 
a risky, complete blood transfusion to effect the 
change in life-orientation. If you meet Kuyperian 
progeny while breathing a different Christian 
world-and-life vision (Anabaptist Mennonite, or 
Roman Catholic), you may notice blind spots in 
the Kuyperians yet be willing to supplement your 
resident perspective with certain Reformational 
biblical strengths. 
The most difficult encounter happens, I 
think, when someone who once had accepted 
the Reformed contours but because of some ac-
cidental affront or mistaken assumption willfully 
decided to reject its vision or let it atrophy. You 
cannot argue such disenchanted people into em-
bracing the Kuyperian tradition again; even try-
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ing to make them jealous of its healing grace for 
distracted people is a tough row to hoe.17
How is the elderly generation to transmit the 
Kuyperian tradition live to the up-and-coming 
generation and take pains to avoid the “Neo-” at-
avism which deforms a percolating visionary tra-
dition into a cliché? I learned from colleague Bill 
Rowe that the handing on of wonts should take 
place face-to-face, seasoned person before novice 
and novice before mentor. The written record of 
the Kuperian tradition should best become oral, 
spoken, with time for response. And I learned 
from colleague Peter Steen that a good teacher 
necessarily simplifies the matter at hand, but in 
such an encouraging way that the student can 
complicate what is shown-and-told, so as not to 
parrot back what is at stake, but own it one’s self.
You become an aide to a Kuyperian senator 
in the legislature; you apprentice yourself as an 
aspiring playwright in the Redeemer Roy Louter 
writing workshop. I learned the Kuyperian fish 
business from watching my Father (who had 
never read Kuyper) swiftly fillet flounders so 
close to the bone you wasted not a pinch of flesh, 
and then tried it hundreds of times over years of 
Saturdays and summers. 
To transmit well the Kuyperian world-and-
life vision takes time—for feedback, corrections, 
revised examples, and the random meaningful 
asides by the tradition-giver. I learned a major 
life-giving (Kuyperian) guideline on being “criti-
cal” from Vollenhoven. I was berating Kuyper for 
being too taken by Idealist Schelling and Neo-
Classical Winckelmann’s thought on the practi-
cally salvific power of beautiful art.18 “Ja, zeker,” 
said Vollenhoven, “maar hij had te veel te doen 
(“Yes, sure, but Kuyper had way too much to 
do.”), implying that a charismatic leader can’t be 
right about everything.
One should not, I believe, overvalue the 
Kuyperian Christian tradition because, like 
any world-and-life vision, its developed format-
ting of one’s consciousness that brings to the 
fore structural features of our life world (What 
is there? How? What’s wrong? Why?) is always 
meshed with the matter of directional choice, 
or where are we headed? What Spirit drives you 
on in your world-and-life vision?19 Unless a win-
some and wise Holy Spirit suffuses and gentles 
the Kuyperian tradition, what does it really 
profit us and our neighbors? However, if we as 
a community live the Kuyperian world-and-life 
vision reformanda, constantly tapping into its 
wisdom-gospel biblical roots (although it is not 
mentioned in Ephesians 6:10-17), the lived, liv-
ing Kuyperian Christian consciousness can be a 
protective hiding place to catch one’s breath in 
our mortal struggle as God’s people with the evil 
principalities and cultural powers that would de-
stroy us all.
One last comment: let me emphasize that a 
committed world-and-life vision is not just sim-
plified lay philosophy, as if the philosophical 
meat is just cut up in tiny bite-size bits so that 
untrained thinkers can swallow it. No! And as 
to the role that literary studies and critical art 
history do and could play in lively carrying on 
the Kuyperian tradition, Dostoevsky’s Crime 
and Punishment novel is as complicated and 
intricate as Bakhtin’s philosophical aesthetics, 
but Dostoevsky’s all-encompassing vision and 
texture is of a nature different from philosophy. 
Dostoevsky with imaginative story is priming 
a mentality of compassion rather than exposit-
ing the fascinating intermeshing of life and re-
flection. Although using metaphors can be very 
dangerous, let me put it this way: philosophers 
sense and eat conceptual meat; world-and-life 
visionaries are thoughtful perceptual vegetar-
ians who formulate imaginative prose essays. 
So, while Reformational philosophers argue 
over their hamburger to gain wisdom for bearing 
their neighbors’ doubts and burdens, Kuyperians 
tell stories, doodle sketches, sing songs, formulate 
manifestoes, and start an Institute for Christian 
Studies, Redeemer College, Citizens for Public 
Justice, Christian Courier, Flagship Gallery...and 
remain Kuyperian vegetarians. According to the 
prophet Isaiah, as I read him, both Covenantal 
Jesus Christ-following diaconal meat-eaters and 
vegetarians will feast with “well-aged wines” 
together on the new earth (Isaiah 25:6-9). (I 
could mention, I have never met an over-weight 
Seventh-Day Adventist vegetarian....) 
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Dear Dr. Walicord,
I often read Pro Rege with interest, as it con-
tains important articles on matters of significance 
which are pertinent to our calling to discipleship. 
The vision of Kuyper that the whole of human 
life is to be brought into subjection to Christ is 
one that is frequently voiced with approval. It is 
a vision which inspires and motivates many of us 
world-wide in our efforts to be faithful in all that 
we do.
It was a surprise, then, to read your review 
of Gary North’s book, Christian Economics in 
One Lesson (http://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/
pro_rege/vol46/iss1/6/). While I do not pretend to 
any expertise in economics, I wish to challenge the 
approach you have taken in your review because 
I believe it is taking a mistaken path, one which 
does not do credit to the Lord whom we serve.
While you start with Kuyper’s famous rally-
ing cry, in what follows you espouse an under-
standing of economics which is radically dif-
ferent from that of many of Kuyper’s spiritual 
followers. You seem to hold that both Kuyper’s 
followers, and Kuyper himself, are inconsistent 
in applying biblical principles to economic life, 
given that you state that biblically consistent 
publications in economics and politics are a “rari-
ty in our day and age.” This does not ring true for 
those of us who are familiar with, for instance, 
the works of Bob Goudzwaard, Jim Skillen and 
Alan Storkey. Their vision for economics and for 
politics is pervasively informed by the Scriptures, 
while being academically thorough in their anal-
ysis and proposals for reform. You do not refer to 
these authors and their work, while asserting that 
economics is under-served in the application of 
biblical teaching to that subject. There are oth-
ers who have also worked on developing a bibli-
cally faithful approach to economics within the 
Kuyperian tradition: to name but a few, Tony 
Cramp, George Monsma and John Tiemstra. 
Many of these draw on the work of Christian 
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economists working in the Kuyperian tradition 
in earlier generations, such as T. P. van der Kooy. 
While these authors (and others also working 
in the same Kuyperian spirit) may not be well 
known, and are certainly not as numerous or as 
influential as we may like, it would be doing a dis-
service to them and their potential readers (who 
otherwise may not be spurred to seek them out) 
to describe biblical works in economics as a “rar-
ity.” There have also been a significant number of 
authors writing on politics in a biblically faithful 
approach, such as Bernie Zylstra, Paul Marshall, 
Jonathan Chaplin, Sander Griffioen, David 
Koyzis, Romel Bagares, Rockne McCarthy and 
Richard Mouw, and again those of earlier gen-
erations: Jan Dengerink, Herman Dooyeweerd, 
Antheunis Janse, and others.
Would it then be correct to assume that you 
place these thinkers in the category of the “bibli-
cally inconsistent” or who only pay “lip service” 
to God’s Word, or are part of the “sometimes 
biblically inconsistent, ivory-tower transforma-
tionalist crowd”? Is that why you do not men-
tion their work even in passing, hurrying on to 
laud the works of Gary North, whose views are 
inescapably incompatible with those of the writ-
ers mentioned above?
You mention that Kuyper’s inconsisten-
cies led to the democratic-welfare state in the 
Netherlands. Whether the modern Dutch welfare 
state can be attributed to (or blamed on) Kuyper 
is probably debatable, but clearly you see a con-
nection between the beliefs he espoused and the 
eventual emergence of the welfare state. Leaving 
aside the historical validity of this connection 
for others to explore, it is true that Kuyper had 
significant concern for the welfare of the poorer 
folk of his day, as can be seen from his stirring 
address at the First Christian Social Congress in 
The Netherlands in 1891 (The Problem of Poverty, 
translated by Jim Skillen). The politics and eco-
nomics of Kuyper cannot easily be slotted into 
“socialist” or “capitalist” or other categories, since 
he made strenuous efforts (however unsuccess-
fully at times) to be biblical in his approach. He 
must be given credit for his achievement in pur-
suing that goal and for his influence in this re-
gard such that nearly 100 years after his death his 
work is still being studied for guidance in how to 
live faithfully before the Lord in every area of life.
Many of us who read Goudzwaard, Skillen, 
and Storkey with appreciation also have some ac-
quaintance with at least the basic approach, if not 
the details, of the views of Gary North and oth-
ers in that line of thought. It is not an approach 
which appeals to us, not because we are closet 
Marxists or humanistic in our thinking but be-
cause we read the Bible in a different way from 
North. Those in the Kuyperian tradition have 
clearly demarcated their views from the Marxists 
and other humanist thinkers. Indeed, Antheunis 
Janse frequently emphasised that the common 
error of Marxists, Socialists, Capitalists and oth-
ers is that the economic side of life was elevated 
to a position of dominance over everything else, 
supplanting the Lord of Glory, who alone rules 
over all of life. This criticism would apply to the 
Austrian school of economics of Hayek and von 
Mises, who, it appears, have influenced Gary 
North more than other thinkers.
Those who differ from North you describe 
a number of times as “biblically inconsistent” 
while North is described several times as “bibli-
cally consistent” or “consistently biblical.” You do 
not state anywhere what “biblically consistent” 
means, but it seemingly does not apply, in your 
view, to those who hold views which differ from 
those espoused by North. Perhaps you could en-
lighten us as to what you consider “consistency” 
with Scripture means and why you seem to privi-
lege this term over others such as “faithful to 
Scripture.” Surely consistency means more than 
following the principles of a tight logical system, 
which appears to originate more from human-
ist economic and political theories than from 
Scripture. One of the criticisms of the approach 
taken by North and those who follow him has 
been the way in which Scripture is interpreted in 
a rigid and fundamentalistic manner, which pays 
scant attention to context (textual, historical, 
social, political, etc.) that urges the application 
of OT law immediately to our contemporary 
situation. North’s approach is not the only one 
which claims to bring the insights of the whole of 
Scripture to bear on contemporary life in a way 
which is faithful to the one True King. It would 
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seem to me that North is significantly less suc-
cessful in this task than many others, including 
those already mentioned.
I would be interested to hear from you how 
different North’s approach is from that of Hazlitt, 
whose book, which he has re-written, was the 
stimulus for your review. You clearly say that 
North takes Hazlitt’s libertarian work and puts 
it into a Christian context. You say that the book 
has been re-written on a 
biblical-moral foundation 
instead of a foundation in 
humanistic pragmatism. 
Those who follow Kuyper 
and Dooyeweerd would 
question whether a liber-
tarian work can be used 
as the basis for a Christian 
approach without doing se-
rious distortion to both. Frankly, the presupposi-
tions and approach taken by libertarian econo-
mists are hardly compatible with a biblical view 
of life. Is this then not just another instance of the 
fallacy of synthesis thinking, in which secular hu-
manistic views are melded with biblical concepts 
into a mixture of iron and clay? Such a synthe-
sis cannot be authentically either humanistic or 
Christian. While North and others of that school 
are more than happy to critique the foundational 
principles of socialists and Marxists, they seem 
strangely reticent to apply the same depth of cri-
tique to the foundational principles of capitalism 
(and not just the pragmatistic avoidance of mo-
rality). It raises the question as to why North did 
not write a book from scratch instead of adopting 
and adapting one originating from an unbiblical 
perspective.
The differences between North and the 
Kuyperian tradition can be seen, for instance, 
in the latter’s approach to the Bible, in which 
the task of government is understood positively. 
North objects to government “intrusion” into 
the social order. Following North, it seems, you 
speak negatively of the government multiple 
times, using such terms as “intrusions,” “exces-
sive intrusions,” or “violation of property rights.” 
Such polemics are unhelpful when what we need 
to know is how we should understand the proper 
task of government, and what principles and pol-
icies would be best to enable free and prosperous 
human life, without the distortions of free-mar-
ket (neo-liberal) policies that benefit, above oth-
ers, the wealthy, the multi-national corporations, 
and the financiers, who often do their utmost to 
avoid paying any tax at all, let alone the minimal 
amount they seem to pay. 
What unfortunately is communicated by the 
kinds of polemics you of-
fer against government and 
its “intrusions” and “viola-
tions” is support for those 
who seek to avoid contrib-
uting to the public coffers 
to fund the activities of 
government, while the ex-
tremes of their wealth sits 
alongside the economic 
hardship and struggles of millions in the same 
society who have to do without adequate food, 
clothing, employment, education, shelter and 
health care, to mention but a few of their needs.
Can you not see that the constant reiteration 
of the theme that anything governments do in 
relation to the economy is “intervention” or “in-
trusion” contributes to a denigration of govern-
ment per se and fosters not positive civil virtues 
in citizens but fear and suspicion? I struggled to 
find anything positive said about government in 
North’s book. There seems to be a Manichean 
spirit running through his works, which makes 
government (in any form, since it seems that all 
he can say about government is to attack its every 
action as “intrusion”) something to be feared and 
resisted, while an economy free from regulation 
is extolled as good and desirable. For North, it 
seems, taxation is always “theft.” Can there be 
any good thing done by government (apart from 
protecting the economy from any interference) 
and can any form of taxation be anything but 
“theft”? It seems not from what you say.
Perhaps you could provide a positive de-
scription of the task of government, which is 
“God’s servant for your good” (Romans 13:4). 
Can there be a legitimate government that does 
more than the barest possible minimum (what-
ever that minimum)? Can you explain why the 
Following North, it seems, 
you speak negatively of the 
government multiple times, 
using such terms as “intrusions,” 
“excessive intrusions,” or 
“violation of property rights.”
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Scriptures throughout speak of God’s relation-
ship to the creation and the people within it in 
political terms—God “rules”; he is “King”; he 
issues laws—if government is so lacking in le-
gitimacy? Surely disparaging government is to 
speak slightingly of the King not only who gives 
us government but who also adopts that imagery 
for his own relationship with us (not exclusively, 
of course, but extensively).
The focus for those who take a different line, 
more closely aligned with that of Kuyper, is not 
the extent to which government engages with so-
ciety (as if there were a simple measure of more 
or less, with the “correct” level somewhere on 
that scale) but the appropriateness of the engage-
ment that should take place. There is no doubt 
that there is an appropriate task for government 
in Christian political theory and practice. In ad-
dition to the clear teaching of Scripture in which 
government is spoken of as God’s servant, it is 
also clear that the phenomenon of government is 
grounded in the creation order, as there is nothing 
that can exist save that which has been provided 
for by God in his order for creation. This is so, 
despite the fact that government (and every other 
area of life) has been distorted and contaminated 
by human sin—the creational order in which it is 
founded still remains in place, sustained by God 
in every way. Were there no basis in the creation 
order for the phenomenon of government, then it 
could not exist. Clearly, then, government is not 
merely legitimate but helpful for us. That many 
governments around the world are tyrannical, 
despotic, or otherwise corrupt does not detract 
from the fact that government is a gift from God 
for the good of humankind. It is the way it is used 
and abused that needs correction, and all too of-
ten we find that it is rampant, free-market capi-
talism through neo-liberal ideology which props 
up the worst forms of government around the 
world for its own economic benefit. It has been 
said of some of the repressive anti-democratic 
dictatorships which imposed free-market ideol-
ogy while engaged in brutality against unions or 
others who protested the actions of the govern-
ment, that “people had to be imprisoned so that 
the market could be free.”
You say that compassion for the poor is not 
compatible with government-forced redistribu-
tion, and that this is theft in violation of the com-
mandment “You shall not steal.” At this point 
your support for minimal government, minimal 
tax (if any), and no redistribution simply un-
dercuts any claim to be presenting a Christian 
faithful concern for the whole of society, not just 
for those who have managed to secure massive 
amounts of wealth. You suggest that compassion 
for the poor and distribution of funds should be 
voluntary. Unfortunately, this is not what we find 
with the massively wealthy—they do not support 
the poor. In fact their wealth is often garnered 
through enterprises which pay wages so low it is 
almost impossible to live on them, and from ma-
nipulating their finances to minimise whatever 
taxes they cannot completely avoid. The kinds 
of political and economic views you espouse 
here are of one piece with those who advocate 
rampant neo-liberal free-market economics and 
are a poor reflection of the depth and richness 
of insight into economic and political realities 
which has been presented by the various authors 
mentioned above (along with others I have not 
mentioned).
The focus on “theft” seems to arise from 
North’s contention that the eighth command-
ment, “You shall not steal,” is the principal basis 
for any sound economic perspective. This seems 
to place far too great a burden on a few words 
(four in English, two in Hebrew). There are many 
more substantive discussions of economic life in 
the Old Testament, which surely indicate that 
economics goes far beyond simply a proscription 
of theft and exaltation of property rights. And to 
extend that proscription to rejection of the right 
of governments to raise funds by taxation is sim-
ply unsupportable by sound exegesis. This fact 
can be seen even more starkly in North’s claim in 
his book that the sin of Adam and Eve in taking 
the fruit of the tree was a breach of the prohibi-
tion against theft—in fact he says that this first 
prohibition in the Bible is the prohibition against 
theft and promotion of property rights. This view 
is simply astonishing. Surely the sin of Adam and 
Eve involves more than theft? That this is not 
a misreading of North is confirmed by the fact 
that he makes the same comment three times in 
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his book, each time expressing the view that the 
sin of Adam and Eve was theft. While they did 
steal the fruit, what was involved was not simply 
a breach of God’s property rights (which is what 
North makes it seem) but a life-encompassing 
breach of covenant, which affected Adam and 
Eve in every way. Their sin was a religious change 
of orientation of the heart away from obedience 
to God towards a false authority, a false pretence 
to autonomy, which established idolatry at their 
very core. Seeing it simply as “theft” fails to do 
justice to the depth and extent of their disobedi-
ence.
It would be of interest to those who follow 
Kuyper’s line to know more about your reasons 
for considering Gary North to be consistent in ap-
plying the Scriptures to economics, and whether 
you consider Goudzwaard, Skillen and Storkey 
to be inconsistent, ivory-tower thinkers, along 
with Kuyper. Surely you have not dismissed their 
views in a cavalier manner without considering 
their work carefully, but since their views are not 
compatible with those of Gary North, I would be 
interested to hear what it is exactly that you find 
unsatisfying in their approach.
You have commended North’s book to any 
interested Christian who wants to be a respon-
sible citizen and an obedient child of God in all 
areas of life. For the reasons given above, I sug-
gest that rather than a biblically faithful presenta-
tion of political and economic life, North’s book 
presents a narrow, constricted, and suspect per-
spective that fails to do adequate justice to the 
breadth and depth of life in all its complexity or 
to the drastic consequences of sin in all its horror 
and power. It does not present a vision that opens 
up Christian discipleship in all of life, but to the 
contrary, it distorts the teaching of Scripture in 
significant ways and reduces its view of econom-
ics to a very constricted vision. There are many 
books by other Christian authors that do a much 
more effective job in presenting the calling for 
faithfulness to God in all of life and specifically 
for economics. I would encourage you to give 
them due consideration and reflect on the limi-
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Let me begin by thanking you for taking the 
time to write a review of my review, so to speak. 
I have to say that I find it a little difficult to reply 
to your extensive letter because it is filled with in-
nuendos, platitudes, and very loose references to 
Scripture without cogent, exegetically-sound ar-
guments. It is clear that you do not like the free-
market view and that you prefer the approach 
of forced governmental redistribution when it 
comes to social issues. To answer all your claims 
and assumptions would require an extensive re-
ply for which, frankly, I neither have time nor 
enough space in this publication. Therefore, I 
will try to reply in a more general way.
Please allow me to provide a short excerpt of 
my biography before I answer some of your con-
Dr. Sacha Walicord is Associate Professor of Business 
Administration at Dordt College. 
cerns to help you understand my views. 
Raised in Europe, I was indoctrinated with 
statism and “big government socialism” from an 
early age. This happened in school, through the 
media, and through many other venues. We were 
constantly told how great it was to have govern-
ment provide everything we needed. It was often 
added how evil the U.S. social system was and 
that people there were dying outside of hospitals 
due to lack of finances and the absence of pub-
lic health insurance. Growing up, I believed all 
of this because it was all I had ever heard. Not 
once can I remember even hearing a critical view 
of such a worldview and essentially grew up a 
Marxist. I promoted and defended this view. 
When I was confronted with the saving Gospel 
of Jesus Christ and became a believer in my mid-
teens, I began to see the world and everything in 
it with new eyes. This was, of course, a long pro-
cess, but essentially, I came to understand the an-
tithesis, the incompatibility of light with darkness, 
of the world with the Kingdom of God. Through 
this, I learned that I had to rigorously re-think 
everything in biblical terms. I had been made new 
in the eyes of God through Jesus Christ, and this 
“newness” had to play out in every single area of 
my life and thinking—or to say it in Dr. Kuyper’s 
great words, in “every square inch” of my exis-
tence. As I went through university, law school, 
and later graduate school, this antithesis between 
the world and God’s Kingdom became even 
clearer to me, and I learned that classrooms are 
a battlefield for the minds of future generations. 
I was forced to decide either to push back or to 
abandon my Christian convictions. In line with 
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my conscience, I decided to push back. Later, 
as an economics professor, I had to search for a 
biblical view of economics. I quickly understood 
that God’s Word assigned very limited powers 
to government, but I still needed more clarity 
on the matter. To be perfectly honest, I did not 
find this clarity among colleagues of your per-
suasion—not at all. I found among them, what 
seemed to me, little to no commitment to sola 
scriptura and a strong presuppositional, faith-like 
commitment to both theo-
logical and political liberal-
ism. This, of course, is only 
my very subjective percep-
tion, but I did not see them 
defending the integrity of 
Scripture against secular 
onslaughts. On the con-
trary, it seemed to me that 
for them the enemy was 
not theological liberalism 
but theologically conservative, Bible-believing 
Christians, whom they would often condescend-
ingly call “fundamentalists,” “prooftexters,” or 
“biblicists.” It seemed to me that they would de-
fend their views not with sound biblical exegesis 
but with lofty philosophical jargon, which the 
average Christian in the pew would never be able 
to follow. It looked as though they were seek-
ing to constitute something like a “new priest-
hood” or a theological “uber-class,” which “ordi-
nary” Christians and pastors needed in order to 
understand the complex teachings of Scripture. 
Reading your letter, and considering the deroga-
tory emails that were written to my superiors and 
colleagues by your like-minded friends, without 
including me in the discussion, in reaction to my 
little book review, I have to admit that it certainly 
feels like the mindset I just described. It appears 
that a difference of opinion—especially pub-
licly—is not taken well by proponents of your 
persuasion. 
In regards to the content of your letter, I have 
to admit that I was taken aback by the incoher-
ence of your argument and your almost disingen-
uous misrepresentations of Dr. North’s and my 
own views. To give you an example, your claim 
that we were against taxes and government alto-
gether is expressly wrong and a blatant misrepre-
sentation of the truth. Furthermore, you claim 
that we were proponents of humanist libertari-
anism, which is utterly ludicrous because North 
states exactly the opposite at length in his book 
(see Preface, Introduction, and Chapter 1!), as 
do I expressly in my book review. North goes to 
great lengths to explain Hazlitt’s weaknesses and 
the fallacy of humanist libertarianism. I have no 
problem with discussing opposing views, but I do 
not appreciate misrepresen-
tations of views and straw-
man arguments. Moreover, 
I was quite surprised to read 
the following statement in 
your letter: “Frankly, the 
presuppositions and ap-
proach taken by libertar-
ian economists are hardly 
compatible with a biblical 
view of life. Is this then not 
another instance of the fallacy of synthesis think-
ing, in which secular humanists views are meld-
ed with biblical concepts into a mixture of iron 
and clay?” You are absolutely correct, but what 
is your purpose in telling me this? Both North 
and I (even in my short review) have in clearest 
terms distanced ourselves from a humanist lib-
ertarianism. In fact, that is what North’s book 
is all about, to defend the free market as biblical 
and not from a humanist standpoint (have you 
really read the book?). And yet, I do have to ask 
you why you do not express a similar warning 
against statism/socialism in your letter. After all 
you seem to find it necessary to point out several 
times that you are not of the socialist persuasion. 
Help me understand how your own statist view, 
for which at no point you provide a coherent bib-
lical defense, is not—to put it again in your own 
words—“another instance of the fallacy of syn-
thesis thinking, in which secular humanist views 
are melded with biblical concepts into a mixture 
of iron and clay?”
It seems to me that your entire letter seeks to 
build a strawman argument, with secular “rob-
ber-baron-capitalism” on one side and an infal-
lible “oh-so-compassionate and selfless” govern-
ment on the other. Then you attack this made-up, 
It seems to me that your entire 
letter seeks to build a strawman 
argument, with secular “robber-
baron-capitalism” on one 
side and an infallible “oh-so-
compassionate and selfless” 
government on the other.
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quasi-capitalist position and immediately claim 
victory. In agreement, I do not like the straw-
man-capitalism that you describe, but the utopian 
statism/socialism that you present as a solution 
cannot exist as it is in stark conflict with human 
nature. Fallen man will not suddenly become 
perfect and selfless as soon as he becomes a gov-
ernment redistributor of other people’s wealth. If 
you give fallen humans unbridled power of the 
sword, they will abuse it every time. Statism and 
socialism were never about compassion for the 
poor but about power for the elite and bureau-
crats, who want to control every area of people’s 
lives—or to say it in Gideon J. Tucker’s famous 
words, “No man’s life, liberty, or property is safe 
while the legislature is in session.”
Also, your use of isolated passages of Scripture 
(prooftexting?) is quite troubling to me. In typi-
cal liberal manner you keep calling for “sound 
exegesis,” but you do not provide any—even re-
motely sound—biblical exegesis yourself. In fact, 
you seem to quote Kuyper more than Scripture, 
and even then, you are more trying to interpret 
his views in your favor than actually quote him. 
You use Scripture where it fits your argument 
but revert to lofty philosophical jargon and ap-
peal to emotion where Scripture does not support 
your views—when you repeatedly and in quite 
dramatic fashion refer to the plight of the poor, 
seeking to make your case for big government by 
appealing to the readers’ emotions. Furthermore, 
you use Romans 13:4 to make the case for exten-
sive government responsibility as government’s 
being “God’s minister to you for good” while not 
allowing the rest of the passage to explain just 
what precisely this “good” is—only because it 
does not seem to fit your argument. That is not 
exegesis but eisegesis—you are trying to force 
your own preferences unto the text of Scripture. 
Thereby you are neglecting a fundamental prin-
ciple of Reformed biblical interpretation, namely 
to let Scripture interpret Scripture. It is this very 
passage (Romans 13) that explains what this 
“good” is, but you fill the term with your own 
preferences. If you want to allow a government to 
extend its power to whatever government thinks 
is “good,” you have clearly opened the door to all 
sorts of tyranny. The argument of tyrannical gov-
ernments and dictatorships throughout history 
has always been, “We know what is good for you.” 
You seem to make the opposite case, that the free 
market view with a very limited government is 
prone to oppression and tyranny. Accordingly, 
you write, “It has been said of some of the repres-
sive anti-democratic dictatorships which imposed 
free-market ideology while engaged in brutality 
against unions or others who protested the ac-
tions of the government, that people had to be 
imprisoned so that the market could be free.” Do 
you understand the self-defeating nature of your 
own argument here? Take note how your state-
ment begins! It begins with the words “repressive 
anti-democratic dictatorships.” Dictatorships are 
governments...the same institution that North 
and I say must be limited in its power and which 
you want empowered to run society for us.
As one reads your letter, you sound increas-
ingly hostile to wealthy/productive people. At 
some point you write “[Y]ou suggest that com-
passion for the poor and distribution of funds 
should be voluntary. Unfortunately, this is not 
what we find with the massively wealthy—
they do not support the poor.” May I ask how 
you justify such a blank statement? Is there any 
sound data to back up such a conclusion, or is 
this just another speculation on your behalf? 
Furthermore, I wonder why the default mode in 
your circles seems to be to call on Caesar to help 
the poor and not to call the church to pick up her 
God-ordained diaconal duty. I think this is quite 
telling. God calls us, as Christians, to care for the 
poor. He does not call us to call on the government 
to care for the poor. As one reads your letter, one 
cannot help but observe that you revert more and 
more into a language of class warfare with “the 
(evil) wealthy” on one side and “the (good) poor” 
on the other. This is, of course, a false dichotomy 
and seeks to stir up emotions rather than state 
facts. Such an emotionalized argument builds on 
a breach of the Tenth Commandment and seeks 
to stir people’s emotions against a group of peo-
ple based on their income and not based on their 
moral quality. This strategy is highly divisive and 
wrong.
In your letter you continuously mention the 
names of your favorite scholars and criticize me 
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for not mentioning them. This is a rather strange 
criticism since I was reviewing a book by Gary 
North. Why would I then mention Goudzwaard, 
Skillen, Storkey, and others? I like much of Dr. 
Goudzwaard’s criticism of Marxism in his 1972 
ICS lectures, but these men are not the ones I 
would go to for sound biblical economic solu-
tions. Also, since you are complaining about my 
ignoring them, let me ask you why these and 
other like-minded thinkers have never (at least to 
my knowledge) published an objection to Gary 
North’s extensive publications on the topic of 
biblical economics? North has published a com-
prehensive economic commentary on the Bible, 
which is available free of charge on the internet. 
He has been criticizing these men’s economic ap-
proach in print for over 50 years. Where is the 
response? I am not aware of any, but I might be 
wrong.
Let me unequivocally express that I will con-
tinue to teach my students whatever approach I 
find in God’s Word. At the end of the day it is 
not Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, or North that we will 
all be accountable to but to the God of the Bible. 
Over the years it has become clear to me with-
out a shadow of a doubt that the Bible teaches 
a very limited role of civil government (Rom. 
13:1-7 etc.) and a strong protection of private 
property (Ex. 20:15, Matt. 20:15, Acts 5:4 etc.). 
Furthermore, I do believe in the validity of tax-
es as long as they are under 10 percent (1 Sam. 
8:10, 14) and as long as they are used for tasks 
assigned to the civil government in God’s Word. 
Therefore, whatever civil government is autho-
rized to take according to God’s Word is not theft 
and whatever civil government is authorized and 
called to do according to God’s Word is not sin-
ful intrusion. My question for you would be this: 
can the government ever steal, or is this by your 
definition of government impossible because it is, 
well,…the government? In that case we will have 
to change the commandment from “Thou shalt 
not steal” to “Thou shalt not steal—with the ex-
ception of government” or “Thou shalt not steal 
—except by majority vote.” 
I am always stunned that as some colleagues 
in academia seem to be more than willing to ac-
cept grants, donations, and salaries from capital-
ist donors and parents, while at the same time 
they try to indoctrinate the very same capitalists’ 
children with statist and socialist ideas—espe-
cially those from biblically conservative families. 
That, to me, is the peak of hypocrisy and dis-
honesty. It has become so en vogue to push so-
cialism and other liberal causes in academia that 
not being inclined to do such often means not to 
be taken seriously as an academic. Everyone, it 
seems, who dares to object will be shouted down, 
intimidated, and slandered. I learned that again 
with my short book review in Pro Rege, and yet I 
will not be intimidated.
In closing, I would like to leave you with my 
most important appeal. Critical to our families, 
churches, schools, and cherished institutions is 
the fact that our Reformed heritage, which stems 
from an unwavering faithfulness to the Word 
of God, must be renewed in every generation. 
Constantly, we must battle against compromise 
in regards to our historic faith, lest liberalism 
creep in, which, unabated will always end in 
apostasy in the next generation. Our very college 
is named after the great Dutch synod of 1618, 
when our Christian ancestors valiantly stood 
against the theological errors of their day. Four 
hundred years later, the battle has remained un-
changed for us. 
Thank you again, for interacting with me 
through Pro Rege. I am afraid that this exchange 
could easily develop into an endless back-and-
forth between us. Therefore, in case you insist 
on continuing this exchange, I would be open to 
a friendly formal debate with you on our cam-
pus if a sponsor for such a debate can be found. 
Whatever disagreements you might have with 
Dr. North, I encourage you to take up with him. 
Considering that we are talking only about a 
simple book review, we have already invested a 
lot of time and words.
Every blessing!
Rev. Sacha Walicord, Ph.D.
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BOOK REVIEWS
The Lost World of the Israelite Conquest. John H. Walton and J. Harvey Walton. Downer’s Grove, 
Illinois: Intervarsity Press Academic, 2017. 288pp. ISBN: 978-0830851843. Reviewed by Justin Bailey, 
Assistant Professor of Theology, Dordt College.
John Walton’s first two “Lost World” books 
aimed to illuminate the opening chapters of 
the Bible. Convinced that the rich imaginative 
universe of the biblical writers is often occluded 
in contemporary debates about human origins, 
Walton sought to supply the “ancient cognitive 
environment” that gets lost in translation. Both 
books were popular and provocative, challenging 
modern assumptions about the Genesis account 
as well as the larger project of Old Testament 
interpretation. Walton’s burden is to remind 
modern readers that the strangeness of Scripture 
demands our respect. His careful work with 
Ancient Near Eastern sources often reveals the 
vast distance between the biblical text and our 
modern outlook, even as it seeks to build bridges 
for our understanding.
For this third book in what has become 
an unintended “Lost World” series, J. Harvey 
Walton (son of John Walton) takes aim at the 
Israelite conquest of Canaan, as described in the 
biblical book of Joshua, with the elder Walton 
in a consulting and editorial role. The authors’ 
basic argument is that modern interpreters have 
misunderstood and misapplied these texts in 
Joshua. This is the case for cultured despisers of 
religion, who condemn the conquest as genocide, 
as well as for Christian apologists, who legitimize 
the conquest as divine judgment. The interpretive 
failure, the authors opine, is multi-dimensional. 
Lacking a proper picture of what the Bible is (an 
ancient document), we adjudicate the text by 
modern conceptions of progress and goodness. 
Ignoring the literary intent of Canaanite depiction, 
we judge the Canaanites as “doomed for their sin.” 
Lacking historical appreciation of ancient conquest 
narratives, we miss the literary and theological 
significance of Joshua’s genre. Lacking a nuanced 
conceptualization of the key word kherem (Joshua 
2:10, 6:17-18), we mistranslate it as “utterly 
destroy” instead of “remove from use.”
The authors argue that what is actually 
happening in the Canaanite conquest narratives 
recapitulates the creation account in Genesis: 
the establishment of cosmos from chaos, the 
institution of order in a non-ordered realm, and 
the clearing of a space in which God can dwell 
with his people. In other words, the Waltons 
do not attempt to construct an apology for the 
conquest so much as situate it within its ancient 
context. The authors argue that portrayals of the 
Canaanites fit an ancient trope, borne out by 
other sources, that of the “invincible barbarians” 
who must be expelled. This is a literary device 
used to demonstrate that the land is not procured 
by the might of the Israelites alone, but by divine 
assistance. The need to justify the conquest of the 
Israelites, they point out, is not felt by the ancient 
author: “The Canaanites are being destroyed 
by Yahweh because that is always the destiny 
of invincible barbarians” (147). Thus readings 
of the conquest as commensurate to Canaanite 
evil miss the point just as much as readings that 
paint the conquest as genocide. Both are poor 
interpretations of what is actually going on in the 
book of Joshua.
Although Israel’s compliance with the kherem 
command did involve military violence, the 
authors argue that the concept is neither implicitly 
nor comprehensively destructive. Understood 
in context, it has to do with the clarifying of 
covenantal identity: its purpose was to “forfeit 
the right to administer the territory and instead 
turn the site over to the deity for the deity’s 
own use” (240). Thus the modern application 
of this has “nothing to do with killing people,” 
for in the new covenant, “the element of land is 
recapitulated by the believers themselves” (239-
240). In the final chapter, the authors seek to 
draw a parallel between the kherem command and 
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the mortification passages in the New Testament 
(Romans 6:3-4, Galatians 5:24, Colossians 3:8-
9). To practice kherem in a new covenant context 
means to de-center our prior identities and to 
re-center on the covenant community in Christ. 
Rather than taking over territory or pronouncing 
judgment on those outside our covenantal 
community, Christians kherem themselves, “not 
as a punishment but to make space for God to 
carry out his purposes through their lives” (252).
I take the positive contributions of this 
volume to be twofold. First, the authors provide a 
plausible alternative for kherem that is worthy of 
consideration. Here, kherem signifies the removal 
of Canaanite identities from use in the land so 
that the land and the people in the land may 
be co-identified with Yahweh. In the authors’ 
assessment, this process includes not just military 
conquest but also conversion (e.g. Rahab is an 
example of kherem, not an exception to it). 
Second, the authors illuminate the conquest 
narratives by placing them alongside other 
ancient conquest accounts. To call descriptions of 
the conquest “hyperbolic” is not exactly accurate, 
since these narratives belong to a specific ancient 
genre that seeks a particular perlocutionary effect. 
The recognition of these contexts give coherence 
to the conquest accounts so that we are able to 
appreciate the literary and theological significance 
of what is being narrated in Joshua, rather than 
starting with questions that are foreign to the text. 
Nevertheless, many readers may feel that the 
authors’ systematic dismantling of the traditional 
interpretation of the conquest is strained. The 
Waltons argue that depictions of Canaanite 
evil are intended to critique Israel rather than 
condemn the Canaanites, and they claim that 
the conquest narratives are concerned with 
driving out the forces of chaos and establishing 
cosmological order rather than with judging 
sin. Yet, in both cases, it is difficult to see why it 
cannot be all of the above. That the authors are 
accurate in what they affirm does not necessarily 
rule out what they deny. 
As the work of two authors, The Lost World 
of the Israelite Conquest is both like and unlike 
the earlier two “Lost World” volumes by John 
Walton. It is built on the same interpretive 
assumptions and follows the same basic method. 
Structurally, it organizes its argument around 
twenty-one propositions, each of which stands as 
the title of short chapters that cumulatively make 
the case. This can be a benefit to most readers: 
the sometimes dense material is mitigated by the 
efficiency of each chapter’s aim. The argument, 
thus constructed, is relatively easy to follow. 
At the same time, this third volume is also 
unlike the earlier volumes: largely penned by the 
younger Walton, the prose is less practiced, and 
this less-practiced prose sometimes pulls the book 
towards overly ambitious pronouncements. That, 
together with the elder Walton’s interpretive 
minimalism, results in a reading of the conquest 
that is simultaneously spare in its interpretations 
of particular texts and provocative in its larger 
interpretive project. 
Indeed, what makes the volume most 
potentially problematic is not the revisionary 
approach to the Israelite conquest but the 
methodological denials that are made along 
the way. The authors take aim at many targets 
tangential to their task, such as Christopher 
Wright’s missiology (Israel is not “expected to 
bring the nations into the covenant” [75]), Walt 
Kaiser’s principlizing hermeneutics (principles 
are extracted from their context so as to become 
“essentially arbitrary” [95]), and any number of 
attempts to derive ethics from Scripture (God’s 
purpose in giving us Scripture “does not include 
teaching us to be moral”[98]). 
With chapters as short and pithy as they are, 
these dismissals cannot help but resemble straw 
men. The authors seem to indicate that most 
attempts to move from the Bible to theology 
are misguided, even as they advance their own 
proposal in the book’s final chapter, an attempt 
that in practice is difficult to distinguish from any 
number of hermeneutical approaches on offer 
(including Kaiser’s!). 
Indeed, the desire to distance their approach 
from moralism leads to some strange conclusions, 
such as this: “We must not conflate the Bible’s 
status and function as Scripture with its status 
and function as literature. Providing us with 
moral knowledge is not its purpose as Scripture; 
consequently, any moral knowledge we can derive 
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from it does not carry the authority of Scripture, 
but rather only the authority of human wisdom” 
(100). I am simply not sure how to understand 
statements like this. That divinely-inspired 
moral direction can and should be derived from 
Scripture is the testimony of the Great Tradition 
and, more notably, of Scripture itself (2 Timothy 
3:16). In the authors’ effort to ensure that we 
mind the gap between the ancient context and 
our own, I worry that they are in danger of 
leaving us with Lessing’s “ugly ditch” between 
history and faith. 
Perhaps the difficulties I found with 
the volume may be no more than those of 
a theologian wanting to bring canonical 
theology to bear on biblical specialists who are 
zealous for close readings of particular texts. 
But hard disjunctions seem methodologically 
commonplace throughout this volume. We are 
given a picture of striking discontinuity between 
the testaments, between holiness and morality, 
and between creation and covenant. On the last 
pair, the authors write, “When the Israelites are 
unfaithful to the Torah, they are not breaking 
God’s universal moral law; they are breaking the 
covenant” (103). Why not both? Does not the 
covenant reveal something about the character of 
the Creator and the grooves of creation? Related 
to this is the authors’ repeated insistence that the 
Canaanites cannot be depicted as guilty since 
they are not in covenantal relationship with 
Yahweh. Does not Yahweh’s sovereignty extend to 
the nations? Shall not the judge of all the earth 
do what is right by the Canaanites, just as surely 
as by the inhabitants of Sodom (Genesis 18:25)? 
This may not be an immediate concern of the 
world of the text, but isn’t it a concern we must 
address as we live in front of the text? And surely 
the larger canonical context has something to 
say on God’s relationship with the nations, the 
accountability and guilt of all humanity, and the 
general contours of God’s design for flourishing. 
These canonical dimensions do not replace the 
meaning of ancient texts in their context, but 
they do fill them in sometimes surprising ways.
In the end, this volume advances the 
conversation on the conquest narratives in some 
important ways. As a part of the Waltons’ larger 
project in restoring lost worlds of meaning, it is 
a gift to interpreters. The question is whether the 
methodological underpinnings of their approach 
can sustain the weight placed upon them. 
The Disruption of Evangelicalism: The Age of Torrey, Mott, McPherson and Hammond. Treloar, Geoffrey 
R. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2017. 335 pp. ISBN: 978-0830825844. Reviewed by 
Keith Sewell, Emeritus Professor of History, Dordt College.
Covering the period between 1900 and 1940, 
The Disruption of Evangelicalism is the fourth 
book in InterVarsity Press’ series titled “A History 
of Evangelicalism: People, Movements, and Ideas 
in the English-Speaking World.” Once the series 
ends with the eventual publication of the fifth 
volume, some will see the series as completing the 
development in evangelical history-writing that 
began with George Marsden’s The Evangelical 
Mind and the New School Presbyterian Experience 
(1970). This book’s author, Geoffrey Treloar, is 
director of learning and teaching at the Australian 
College of Theology, Sydney. He is an authority 
on the historiography of the New Testament 
scholar Joseph Barber Lightfoot (1828-89).
In this fourth volume, Treloar’s subject is 
English-speaking evangelicalism in the period 
following the high points of the nineteenth 
century and the post-1945 era of the Billy 
Graham Crusades. This period was marked 
by what Treloar labels as “disruption.” It was a 
time when the previously unresolved problems 
within evangelicalism were not only not resolved 
but became more fully apparent. These include 
evangelicalism’s inadequate ecclesiology, its 
tendency towards cultural superficiality, and its 
intellectual deficiencies, all of which were already 
manifested in the nineteenth century and, in 
the early decades of the twentieth century, came 
home to roost. 
While not offering “potted biographies” as 
such, Treloar finds exemplars of these divergent 
tendencies in the lives and work of Reuben A. 
Torrey (1856-1928), John R. Mott (1865-1955), 
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be changed), “activism” (the energetic advocacy 
of the gospel), “Biblicism” (an emphatic 
commitment to the Bible), and “crucicentrism” 
(a strong emphasis on the sacrifice of Christ 
on the cross). This formula guides Treloar also; 
however, recognising the disruptive stresses and 
strains impacting evangelicalism in this era, he 
argues that the biblicist-crucicentric emphasis 
became more dominant in the early twentieth 
century (6-7, 192, 201, 226).
Of course, the deeper problem was that the 
over-emphasis of the “quadrilateral of priorities” in 
the life of evangelicalism left it deeply vulnerable 
on a variety of fronts. Evangelicalism lacked an 
integral basis. As I have argued elsewhere, this 
left evangelicalism with serious cultural and 
intellectual deficits. The resulting weaknesses 
were painfully exposed in the nineteenth century. 
The higher critical biblical scholarship emanating 
from Germany, as well as a wholly naturalistic 
evolutionism, had presented evangelicalism with 
challenges that it was ill equipped to surmount. All 
too often, in attempting to face these challenges, 
evangelicalism only ended up making faces at 
them. 
In this volume, Treloar ably describes an 
evangelicalism past its peak influence (11), ill at 
ease with political complexities (107-108), and, 
after 1919, confronting an “unreceptive culture” 
in which it had little or no traction (229, 245). 
One of the most important portions of 
Treloar’s work is where he breaks new ground in 
paying close attention to evangelical responses 
to the First World War and its impact (117-
172). From 1914 and 1917, evangelicals proved 
to be remarkably susceptible to pro-war state 
propaganda. Indeed, the level of evangelical 
cultural naivety could be stunning. Evangelicals 
actually believed that the end of the Great War 
would presage a great worldwide revival—an 
expectation that was utterly unfounded and 
soon dashed. They seemed to have little insight 
into the spiritually wasting impact of protracted 
battlefield carnage. If they had consulted the 
autobiographical writings of Richard Baxter 
(1615-1691), they would have known better. 
The willingness of evangelicals to sign up to a 
“war for righteousness” and their all too frequent 
Aimee Semple McPherson (1890-1944) and 
T.C. Hammond (1877-1961). The first three 
are well known to many American evangelicals 
and well reflect the North American dominance 
of evangelicalism worldwide in the twentieth 
century (17). Hammond is the odd one out, an 
Irishman who is among those responsible for 
the strongly protestant and Reformed character 
of the Anglican Diocese of Sydney in Australia 
(199-200).
The three North Americans all share with 
Hammond an important quality: they all 
anticipate leaders and developments that were 
to be prominent in the post-1945 era. R. A. 
Torrey looks back to Dwight L. Moody, but in 
his global outreach he anticipates J. Edwin Orr 
and especially Billy Graham and his Evangelistic 
Association, founded in 1950. Similarly, the 
fascinating figure of John Mott, the grand 
strategist of global missions at the time of the 
1910 World Missionary Conference held in 
Edinburgh, can be seen as anticipating the phase 
of the ecumenical movement that commenced 
with the World Council of Churches gathering at 
Amsterdam in 1948.
Even more prescient is the controversial 
figure of Aimee Semple McPherson. As a 
celebrity-revivalist Pentecostal, McPherson was 
in many respects a harbinger of the charismatic, 
revivalist mega-church enterprises of the late 
twentieth century. Treloar refers to her “creative 
use of modern communication technologies, 
entertainment[,] and spectacle” (216). Acting 
on the assumption that music and technology 
are religiously neutral, this strain of revivalist 
evangelicalism has promoted mega-churches 
whose apparent success is actually attributable 
to their aping of contemporary pop-culture with 
its narcissistic mores. For the time being, their 
attendance figures are generally seen as indications 
of success; yet they are not the solution to ever-
increasing secularisation but a mark of it, even as 
they drain the life out of many a faltering local 
congregation.
A mark of this entire series is its indebtedness 
to the famous evangelical “quadrilateral of 
priorities,” as defined by David Bebbington: 
“conversionism,” (the belief that lives need to 
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acceptance of the supposedly “neutral” features of 
contemporaneous western culture serve to raise 
confronting questions about the entire sequence. 
One problem with this series, including 
Treloar’s book, is that it is light on the overall 
relationship of evangelicalism with its surrounding 
culture. Why?
Arguably, the answer lies in the point of 
departure exhibited across the entire five volume 
series. These volumes are written from within 
the perspective of evangelicalism itself. As a 
consequence, the series tacitly assumes the validity 
of the reductionism implicit in Bebbington’s 
“quadrilateral.” It views evangelicalism from 
within and according to this frame of reference. 
To make the point in another way, this series 
is valuable in that it provides an insight into 
how some evangelicals now view the history of 
evangelicalism on its own terms.
That said, after reading this series, we 
are left asking the following question: How 
different would it be if we were to abandon a 
historiography of evangelicalism as here restricted 
by the reductionism implicit in the “Bebbington 
quadrilateral” and re-write the story from the 
standpoint that all of life is to be lived Coram Deo, 
before the face of God? In other words, how would 
the structure of the narrative change if we were 
to critically reassess the history of evangelicalism 
from a standpoint that acknowledges that Christ’s 
call to discipleship—“Follow Me”—knows 
no limits, no sacred / secular dichotomies or 
intellectual boundaries, and includes every lawful 
calling and human activity? 
If we were to take this step, we could acquire a 
sharper view of our history as the people of God 
in the world, of our calling as we confront our 
current predicament, and of the challenges that 
will soon be upon us.
Aquinas. Tuininga’s work is that of a disciple of 
VanDrunen (viii, 19). 
This book purports to be presenting Calvin 
in his own terms and in his own context, but 
in reality it does something else—it presents 
Calvin in terms compatible with Tuininga’s 
and VanDrunen’s commitment to their “two 
kingdoms” standpoint. In short, while Tuininga 
claims to be holding the Calvin texts and his latter-
day “two kingdoms” commitment apart (9), in 
practice his “two kingdoms” commitment exerts 
a strong gravitational pull over his discussion of 
the Calvin texts. The “two kingdoms” standpoint 
does not necessarily presume to set aside Christ’s 
kingship over all human culture. Rather, it 
makes the distinction between the church as an 
institution, and the surrounding culture in which 
it is situated, so sharply that the terminology of 
“two kingdoms” becomes a matter of course. As a 
consequence, it may be inferred, or even asserted, 
that the followers of Jesus Christ have and share 
much in common with the thinking and conduct 
of unbelievers.
Calvin’s Political Theology and the Public Engagement of the Church: Christ’s Two Kingdoms. Tuininga, 
Matthew J. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 386 pp. ISBN: 978-1-107-
17143-5. Reviewed by Keith Sewell, Emeritus Professor of History, Dordt College.
Calvin’s Political Theology and the Public 
Engagement of the Church: Christ’s Two Kingdoms 
is an important work. Matthew Tuininga is 
Assistant Professor of Moral Theology at Calvin 
Theological Seminary. This book is not a “quick 
read.” It requires a sustained effort across more 
than nine full chapters, and although Tuininga’s 
readers will learn much from him, they will need 
to study this work with every critical faculty keenly 
engaged and be fully alert to the fraught interplay 
between envisioning Calvin sympathetically in 
his context, and using his work and reputation in 
order to validate the “two kingdoms” thinking of 
certain later reformed thinkers. 
The current resurgence of “two kingdoms” 
thinking owes much to David VanDrunen’s A 
Biblical Case for Natural Law (2006) and Natural 
Law and the Two Kingdoms (2010). These works 
confirm the continuing strength of scholasticism 
in some circles. VanDrunen is the Robert B. 
Strimple Professor of Systematic Theology at 
Westminster Theological Seminary, Escondido, 
CA. VanDrunen’s early work was on Thomas 
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Accordingly, while Tuininga does not set 
out to defend liberal democracy, he is keen 
to demonstrate how, what he repeatedly calls 
“Calvin’s two kingdoms theology,” offers 
Christians a way of understanding how they 
might participate in contemporary liberal 
democracies that they do not control (3-5, 322). 
To this end, Tuininga provides his readers with a 
full overview of Calvin’s reformation setting (23-
60), and the attempted reformation in France (61-
91), as prelude to a detailed discussion of Calvin’s 
teachings on the kingdom of Christ, its spiritual 
character, covenant and law, the responsibilities 
of the civil magistrate, and resistance to tyranny 
(92-354). This is the backbone of the book, and 
the reader will find here much that is instructive 
and worthy of further reflection. 
At the same time, he or she will need to 
be fully alert. A key difficulty is that Tuininga 
repeatedly insists on finding Calvin’s “two 
kingdoms theology” in passages where Calvin 
does not use that terminology himself. The result 
is misleading, and readers would be well advised 
to check passage after passage for themselves. 
For example, Tuininga states that “Calvin’s two 
kingdoms paradigm” pervades his discussion 
of Micah 4:3 (178), but when we consult his 
commentary on this—“the nations will beat 
their swords into ploughshares”—passage, we 
find that Calvin says “the scripture speaks of 
God’s kingdom in two respects,” but nowhere 
in this particular discussion does he use the 
term “two kingdoms.” Similarly, with respect to 
Calvin’s exposition of Joseph’s policy in Egypt as 
presented in Genesis 47:22, Tuininga tells us that 
“Here Calvin’s two kingdoms distinction guides 
his logic”; but again Calvin does not employ any 
explicit “two kingdoms” language at this juncture 
(315). Perhaps a further example will suffice. 
With regard to Calvin’s commentary on Romans 
14:17—“the kingdom of God is not a matter 
of eating and drinking, but of righteousness, 
peace and joy on the Holy Spirit”—Tuininga 
insists that “Calvin’s two kingdoms distinction” 
is evident (157), but again, the explicit use of a 
“two kingdoms” wording is not to be found. 
In short, there is a serious problem here. 
While Tuininga may present himself as leaving 
the advocacy of this “two kingdoms” doctrine 
until his conclusion (355-78), his commitment 
to this doctrine greatly colors his presentation of 
Calvin, to such an extent that he arguably over-
interprets Calvin in his own favor. This question 
must be asked: if we had never previously 
encountered the “two kingdoms” doctrine at all 
but had diligently studied the aforementioned 
passages from Calvin’s commentaries, would we 
have found that doctrine to be as ubiquitous in 
Calvin as does Tuininga? The point here is not 
that the use of this term is always verboten, but 
that it is overemployed by Tuininga in order to 
support his thesis. 
At the same time it should be acknowledged 
that Calvin’s thought was not free from pro-
blematic Hellenistic tendencies. His anthropology 
exhibited Platonic or Neo-Platonic influences 
(151-7). He had his own notion of “natural law” 
(369-72), a pliable concept that may function 
within a scholastic-dualistic natural/supernatural 
or secular/sacred framework. The presence 
of such tendencies, the legacy of centuries of 
Christian intellectual accommodation that the 
Reformation did not eradicate in an instant, 
confirms the need to exercise caution when we 
interpret and appropriate Calvin’s writings.
Of course, Calvin wrote in the Latin and 
French of his day, and some translators may be 
inclined to use “kingdoms” in the plural, where 
others might simply use the word “twofold.” The 
latter can on occasions be overly stretched to 
mean “two kingdoms.” In the Ford Lewis Battles 
edition of Calvin’s Institutes (1960), at Book 
III.19.15, the section heading is given as “The 
Two Kingdoms.” However, this expression does 
not appear in the original as a heading or in the 
text to which it refers. Calvin’s intention here is 
to stress the “twofold” governance to which man 
is subject—“duplex in homine regimen.” In his 
translation of Book IV.20, Battles guides us well 
by using the term “twofold” and does not employ 
the term “two kingdoms.” Interpretation and 
inclination are in play at such points. For example, 
Elsie Anne McKee, in her fine translation of the 
1541 French edition of the Institutes, (2009) uses 
the term “two kingdoms in people” at the start 
of chapter 16, while the original reads “deux 
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regimes en l’homme,” and not specifically “deux 
royaumes.”
That the kingdom has a “twofold” character, 
in the sense of having come but not yet being 
fully realised, is something to which Calvin often 
refers, as Tuininga frequently observes (139, 
179-81, 280, 358), but in Tuininga’s hands this 
consideration is too readily utilized to support 
his “two kingdoms” reading. By contrast, it is not 
irrelevant that half a century ago the American 
scholar H. Harris Harbison, in some of the most 
satisfying and stimulating paragraphs written in 
English on Calvin’s view of history (Christianity 
and History, 1964, 279-287), focused on 
Calvin’s understanding of the kingdom of God 
without ever having recourse to “two kingdoms” 
terminology.
While Tuininga tries to overcome the dualistic 
tendency in “two kingdoms” thinking (1, 92, 
182, 356), it inevitably comes to expression. 
He rightly draws attention to the distinction of 
the church as an institution, and the church as 
the people of God, as also found in Abraham 
Kuyper (373, 375-6). However, while Tuininga 
is comfortable with the church as an institution 
coming to visible and corporate expression, 
beyond the pale of the institutional church it is 
apparently only as “individual Christians” that 
we are called to witness “to the righteousness of 
the kingdom” (376). Presumably there is a place 
for the seminary. However, the Christian political 
organisation, or the Christian university, and 
much more besides, are not in contemplation. 
There are issues here way beyond the scope of 
this review, but many will find this approach 
to be hopelessly inadequate in the face of the 
increasingly strident neo-paganism evident across 
the western world.
In his final book (2003), Heiko A. Oberman 
lamented the baleful impact on Calvin studies 
of those who oriented their research projects to 
their latter-day theological agendas. He was right, 
and it is also right for us to remind ourselves that 
the scriptures only ever speak of one kingdom of 
God.
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